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Trends in Total Capital Formation,
1869—1955
Rate of Growth in Gross and in Net Capital Formation
THIS chapter deals with the long-term trends in total capital forma-
tion—that is, in total current additions to the country's reproducible
capital. The relevant data are summarized in Table 2.
As measured in this table, capital formation comprises: construc-
tion of all types including residential, but excluding repairs and main-
tenance; flow to domestic users of producers' durable goods—machinery
and other equipment but excluding small tools; net changes in in-
ventories of business and, insofar as data permit, of governments; and
net changes in claims against foreign countries. Neither consumers'
durable commodities nor changes in inventories within households
are included. In gross capital formation, the annual volumes of con-
struction and of the flow of producers' durables are taken before de-
duction of current consumption of fixed durable capital; in net capital
formation, the latter is deducted. Capital formation, gross or net, is
a component of national product, gross or net. It represents with-
drawals from aggregate product for the purpose of adding to the stock
of material capital within the country or to claims against other coun-
tries, and it is thus identical with national savings, gross or net.
Since our primary interest is in the volume of capital formation
unaffected by changes in price levels, the totals in Table 2 are in con-
stant prices. And to eliminate not only the shorter business cycles but
also the long swings discussed in Chapter 2, the series were averaged
for periods of at least twenty years. The only exception is the average
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RATE OF GROWTH IN CAPITAL FORMATION, GROSS AND NET, 1929 PRICES, 1869—1955
(amounts in billions of dollars, averages per year)
Gross Net
CapitalCapitalCapitalRatioCapitalRatio
Forma-Consump- Forma-of (2)Retire-of (5)
Periods tion tion tionto (1)mentsto (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VOLUMES
Total
1. 1869—1888 3.48 1.46 2.02 0.42 0.87 0.25
2. 1889—1908 8.68 4.03 4.65 0.46 2.18 0.25
3. 1909—1928 15.5 8.39 7.12 0.54 4.72 0.30
4. 1929—1955 22.7 17.3 5.44 0.76 14.5 0.64
5. 1946—1955 33.0 25.1 7.88 0.76 21.4 0.65
Total, excluding military
3a. 1909—1928 15.0 8.0 7.00 0.53 4.33 0.29
4a. 1929—1955 19.1 14.4 4.69 0.75 11.6 0.61
5a. 1946—1955 29.7 19.3 10.5 0.65 15.6 0.52
PERCENTAGE RATE OP GROWTH PER DECADE, TOTAL PERIOD
Total
6. Line 1 to line 4 34.4 47.6 16,9 55.8
7. Line 1 to line 5 36.7 48.4 20.8 56.1
Total, excluding military
6a. Line I to line 4a 30.8 43.5 14.2 50.5
7a. Line I to line 5a 34.7 43.1 25.7 49.4
PERCENTAGE RATE OF GROWTH PER DECADE, SUBPERIODS
Total
8. Line I to line 2 58.0 66.1 51.8 58.7
9. Line 2 to line 3 33.7 44.3 23.8 47.1
10. Line 3 to line 4 17.7 36.1—10.8 61.1
11. Line 3 to line 5 26.6 40.9 3.2 60.4
Total, excluding military
8. Line I to line 2 58.0 66.1 51.8 58.7
9a. Line2toline3a 31.5 40.9 22.7 40.9
lOa. Line 3a to line 4a 10.9 28.6—15.7 52.2
ha. Line 3a to line 5a 23.8 31.6 13.3 49.1
SOURCE: Lines 1—5: Cols. 1, 2, and 3 calculated from Table R-29; col. 5 calculated by pro-
cedure described in the text.
Lines 3a—5a: Lines 3—5 minus military, calculated from Table R-7.
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for the decade after World War II, shown to reveal the recent level
of peacetime capital formation in the country. The averages in Table 2
are arithmetic means, although the underlying secular trends would
have been more accurately portrayed by geometric means. But we felt
that the additive relation between net capital formation, capital con-
sumption, and gross capital formation retained by using arithmetic
instead of geometric means justified the minor error involved.
The findings suggested by Table 2 may now be listed:
1. The annual volume of gross capital formation increased markedly.
From 1869—1888 to 1929—1955, it rose to almost seven times its origi-
nal level; and during the most recent period, 1946—1955, was at a
level over ninefold that prevailing during 1869—1888. The average
rise per decade over the period was 34 per cent, if we use 1929—1955
as the terminal period; or 37 per cent, if we use the post-World War II
years as terminal.
2. Military construction and other military durables swelled the
volume of total capital formation in recent decades. For many pur-
poses, it may be better to limit capital formation to peacetype goods.
When this is done, the rate of secular growth in gross capital forma-
tion is reduced somewhat, but not appreciably: the rise per decade
from1869—1888 to 1929—1955 is 31 per cent; from 1869—1888 to the
post-World War 11 decade, about 35 per cent.
3. The secular rise in capital consumption was greater than that
in gross capital formation. The formerincreased almost elevenfold
from 1869—1888 to 1929—1955, if we include military capital; slightly
less than ninefold, if we exclude military goods. The rise was even
greater from the average for 1869—1888 to that for the post-World
War II years. The percentage rate of growth per decade ranged, for
the different definitions of the terminal period and including or ex-
cluding consumption of military capital, from 43 per cent to some-
what over 48 per cent.
4. With the higher rate of growth in the volume of capital con-
sumption than in gross capital formation, there was a secular rise in
the proportion of the former to the latter. The ratio of capital con-
sumption to gross capital formation rose from somewhat over four-
tenths in the early decades to over three-quarters (for total capital)
or almost two-thirds (for capital excluding military) in the latest pe-
riod. Correspondingly, the proportion of net capital formation to gross
declined from somewhat less than six-tenths to almost a quarter (for
total capital) or over one-third (for capital excluding military). To put
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it differently, in the earlier decades it took about 1.7 dollars of gross
capital formation to yield 1 dollar of net addition to capital stock;
in the recent period it took from less than 3 to somewhat over 4 dol-
lars of gross capital. formation to yield1 dollar of net addition to
capital stock.
5. The volume of net capital formation also grew significantly, but
at a rate lower than that for either gross capital formation or capital
consumption. From 1869—1888 to 1929—1955, it rose to over 2.5 times
the initial level, and by the post-World War II years had risen to
almost 4 times the initial level, for total capital including military.
If we exclude military capital, the level in the post-World War II
years is more than 5 times as high as that in 1869—1888. But whether
for total or peacetype capital, the net capital formation level in
1929—1955 is well below that in 1909—1928; and when we use 1929—
1955 as the terminal period, the average rate of growth over the
entire period is reduced considerably. The average percentage rate
of growth per decade shown in Table 2 thus varies from 14 to almost
26, depending upon the terminal period used; but in either case it
is appreciably lower than the rate for gross capital formation, which is
over 30 per cent, and that for capital consumption, which is over 40
per cent per decade.
6. When three intervals within the total period are distinguished
(lines 8—li), the percentage rate of growth declines—even when we
terminate the last interval with the post-World War II years, with
their relatively high levels of capital formation and consumption. This
retardation in the percentage rate of growth is observed in all three
totals, including or excluding military capital. The decline in the rate
of growth is most marked for net capital formation, and least marked
for capital consumption.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to an attempt to suggest some of
the factors that may account for the growth of capital formation over
the period. But first it may be useful to discuss the meaning of capital
consumption. Little mystery attaches to the meaning of gross capital
formation: it is largely a flow of tangible and observable commodities
into identifiable channels, and while there are many statistical diffi-
culties in its estimation, the conceptual difficulties are those of scope,
i.e., of inclusion and exclusion (for example, whether we should in-
clude consumers' durables and military capital) and of valuation (pri-
marily allowance for quality changes). Capital consumption, however,
is not a directly observable, but rather an imputed, process; and in
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view of the magnitudes involved, it should be clearly defined. Any
ambiguity in the meaning of capital consumption, of course, affects the
meaning of net capital formation since the latter is the residual after
we deduct capital consumption.
The estimate is described briefly here, the details being provided in
the notes to the basic reference tables in the appendixes. In calculating
capital consumption we assumed a useful life span for the durable
capital involved—that reflected in the depreciation charges of business
firms or, in the case of residential housing, that reflected by diminution
in the market value of a house as it ages. Given these life spans, an-
nual consumption is approximated either on a straight-line principle
or by some simple curve suggested by market experience, the values
being converted from original cost to a 1929 price basis or to a current
replacement cost basis.1 But what do these life spans mean? What is
the meaning of the continuous reduction in the value of a structure
or of a machine from 100 per cent of its value to zero?
An approximate answer to the question would be that the reduction
is intended to reflect the loss in earning power: in the case of business
capital, the loss associated largely with obsolescence because of tech-
nical progress; in the case of residential housing, the loss associated
perhaps more with changes in taste, neighborhood, and other elements
determining desirability. The essential physical productive power of
the capital good may remain unaffected for quite a number of years
after its installation or construction; with proper repairs and main-
tenance (which are assumed but not included in depreciation charges),
the machine or the house is as good as new for a number of years—in
1Thisis not an accurate description. In fact, for our capital consumption series
for the years since 1929, we accept the Department of Commerce estimates of business
capital consumption, including accidental damage and charges to current account,
and add to them estimates of depletion, and of capital consumption of nonfarm
residential construction and government construction. The components (except
nonfarm residential construction) are then carried back by totals derived from the
application of the assumption of a constant life span and of straight-line allocation.
But the resulting estimates, despite the use of Department of Commerce totals for
recent years, approximate for long periods the levels that would be derived on the
basis of the assumed life spans. For example, for 1929—1955, total capital consumption
(in 1929 prices) for producers' durables (excluding military), the component for
which the comparison can be made most directly, was $178 billion in the series
incorporating the Department of Commerce totals, $173 billion in the series based
on 13-year life applied to gross producers' durables (including the nonmilitary equip-
ment going to governments). Thus for long periods, the description in the text
is roughly true; and there is essential statistical comparability between the capital
consumption estimates in column 2 and the capital retirements estimates in column 5.
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fact may be somewhat better after initial adjustments and "settling."
But with the passage of time, new machines become available, which,
per dollar in constant prices, can produce at lower costs; or new types
of houses in new neighborhoods emerge, which, again per dollar in
constant prices, are more desirable—in the sense of suiting better the
housing needs of a given economic or social group. A business firm
must allow for the effects of progress-induced obsolescence on its earn-
ing power if it is to compete in the long run—or, more generally, if it
is to maintain the value of its capital. A house owner must likewise
allow for the erosive effect of changes in tastes, neighborhoods, and so
forth on the value of his house once built and unmodifiable without
further capital expenditures. Simple calculation would demonstrate
that, all other conditions being equal, it would pay an entrepreneur to
use the older machines at lower rates of capacity, and purchase new
ones (to be operated at maximum rates), even though he could still
produce the same volume of goods without increased costs (but not
without foregoing the lower costs possible with the new machines);
and that it would pay a house owner to trade the old house for a new
one long before the physical deterioration of the former reduced its
value to a level close to zero.2
To the extent that it represents obsolescence, capital consumption
does not signify reduction in the absolute level of productive capacity,
nor an increase in absolute cost per unit, but rather the opportunity cost
of not utilizing the more efficient newer capital items. Insofar as this
is true, net capital formation acquires a highly specific meaning: it is
net in the sense of being over and above not merely replacement of
productive capacity but over and above the stock of old capital built
up to the productive capacity which it could have in terms of current
efficiency of a dollar's worth of capital goods. Zero net capital forma-
tion does not, therefore, mean failure to increase the productive ca-
pacity of the capital stock. It only means limiting the increase to the
sum represented by the product of the annual rate of secular ob-
solescence and the already existing capital stock.
2 I have discussed this problem on different occasions, originally in connection
with the acceleration principle, in Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Clair
Mitchell (New York, Columbia University Press, 1985), particularly pp. 228—248,
reprinted in my Economic Change: Selected Essays in Business Cycles. National In-
come, and Economic Growth (New York, Norton, 1952), pp. 66—85; and most re-
cently in a comment on Edward F. Denison's paper in Problems of Capital Forma-
tion: Concepts, Measurement, and Controlling Factors, Vol. 19, Studies in Income
and Wealth (Princeton for NBER, 1957), pp. 271—280.
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Short of detailed technical studies of specific capital goods, it would
be impossible to measure the relative weight in capital consumption
of such obsolescence, as distinct from the physical deterioration which
eventually does come about. And increasing obsolescence would lead
to retirement of a capital good—since, if economic conditions do not
warrant its use, the cost of retaining it, no matter how slight, is still
a cost. A rather speculative estimate of the volume of retirements, as
distinct from capital consumption, is provided in column 5 of Table 2.
Durable goods are assigned the life span implicit in the capital con-
sumption figures, but they are "retired" only at the very end of their
life. We make no deduction in its value while a capital item still has
any useful life; but its full value is deducted at the end, on the pre-
sumption that with completion of its useful life the item is retired
and is no longer available as a productive tool.
The estimate is quite tentative because it depends heavily upon an
estimate of total useful life. But the order of magnitude it suggests
is not without interest. Capital retirements averaged about 0.5 to 0.6
of total capital consumption, until the more recent periods—largely
because they reflect capital formation in the more distant past, while
capital consumption reflects the more recent levels of capital forma-
tion. With a generally upward trend in the volume of capital forma-
tion, retirements will be consistently lower than capital consumption—
the difference being largely a function of the rate of secular rise in
the volume of capital formation. Additions to capital stock, net of
retirements but gross of depreciation on stock still in use, averaged,
in the early periods, about three-quarters of gross capital formation,
retirements averaging about a quarter. It took about one and one-
third dollars of gross capital formation to provide a dollar's addition
to capital stock net of retirements, but gross of accumulated deprecia-
tion on capital items still in use
The relation changed drastically in recent decades—a reflection pri-
marily of the sharp decline in the rate of growth of gross capital
formation, and partly of the emergence of military capital for which
we equated current consumption and retirement. Retirements rose
to between eight- and nine-tenths of total capital consumption, or
between one-half and two-thirds of gross capital formation. Hence,
the trend in additions to capital stock, net of retirements and gross
of other current depreciation charges, resembles the trend in net capi-
tal formation in column 3, showing a sharp decline in the rate of
growth.
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Two corollaries follow. First, in considering how much additional
capital is needed to turn out more product, we must take into account
not only net capital formation (column 3) but also at least the part
that represents the balance of current depreciation over retirements.
For the "replacement" of this balance, as well as of the retirements
themselves, means an addition to capital capacity—greater power to
produce. Second, the totals are obviously interrelated, and not merely
in an additive sense. Capital consumption and retirements of today
are the gross capital formation volumes of yesterday. Given the de-
preciation rates—which change slowly and reflect a rough approxi-
mation to wear, tear, and particularly obsolescence—current gross
capital formation, the most inclusive of the processes in which we are
interested, is a sum of past gross capital formation in the form of either
capital consumption or retirements and net capital formation which
presumably looks toward the future. It is this combination of past and
future that has to be kept in mind in explaining any aspect of capital
formation that takes place currently, that is, within any period whose
trend we are trying to analyze.
Relation to Growth of Population and Labor Force
In considering why capital formation grew at the rates and in the
pattern suggested by Table 2, we may begin with the obvious point
that during the period covered the population and labor force of this
country also grew. If we accept this growth as a datum, it is easy to
argue that the annual volume of capital formation had to increase to
meet the demands of the larger number of people who are the direct
users of at least some of the capital goods (residential and related con-
struction, in particular) and to equip the larger number of workers
with tools of production. Of course, the relation of growth in popula-
tion and in labor force to capital formation is not that simple: popu-
lation and labor force can increase without an increase in capital for-
mation, and vice versa. But the least that can be said is that growing
numbers of consumers and workers mean both increasing need and
increasing productive power, which in turn make more capital forma-
tion necessary and feasible; and unless major obstacles bar the way, the
growth in population and in labor force will increase the volume of
all production, including capital formation.
Another way of expressing the connection between capital formation
and the growth in population and in labor force can be suggested.
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An increase in population enjoying constant income per capita can
induce additions to the stock of houses and related structures without
a decline in the yield of capital so embodied, which would otherwise
be the effect of an increase in housing capital per head. Growth in
labor force can induce enlarged capital stock without a reduction in
yield per dollar of capital which, in the absence of technological
progress and perhaps even with its advance, would otherwise be the
effect of a rise in the ratio of capital to labor. Conversely, growth in
population and in labor force unaccompanied by additions to capital
stock should raise the yield of capital and stimulate capital formation.
How should we compare growth in population and in labor force
with growth in capital formation? The latter represents additions to
the already existing stock. We could (1) compare the stock of capital,
growing as a result of current capital formation, with the human stock,
i.e., total population or labor force; or (2) compare additions to capi-
tal stock—current capital formation—with additions to the stock of
population or labor force. Of the two comparisons the former is to be
preferred. The latter involves the artificial assumption that additions
to capital stock are necessarily closely related to additions to popula-
tion and to labor force. We use this assumption for a specific purpose
later, but the most relevant comparison between growth in capital and
growth in population and in labor force rests on the view that the
total stock of capital is a tool in the hands of, and for the service of,
the total stock of population and workers.
Table 3 brings together the data needed for this comparison. The
net capital stock figure (column 3) is the value, in constant prices, of
the accumulated capital formation, net of current depreciation. But
there are, in addition, two gross capital stock figures. In one—gross,
net of retirements (column 2)—we subtract retirements, but not the
accumulated depreciation of stock that isstill extant because itis
assumed not to have been retired. In the other (column 1), no deduction
for capital consumption is made. This series in column 1, unrealistic
because it exaggerates the volume of capital goods available at any
given time, nevertheless serves the purpose of a kind of upper level.
With these comments, and a note to the effect that the labor force
includes all gainful workers, whether or not employed at the time of
reporting, we summarize the findings suggested by Table 3.
I. As expected, the stock of capital, both net and gross, grew at
high rates. From 1869 to 1955, net capital stock increased to about 16
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TABLE 3 (concluded)
SOURCE: The capital stock figures in col. 3 are net of accumulated depreciation.
The basic figure is that for 1880, taken from Raymond W. Goldsmith, "The Growth
of Reproducible Wealth of the United States of America from 1805 to 1950," Income
and Wealth, Series II (International Association for Research in Income and Wealth,
Cambridge, England, Bowes and Bowes, 1952), Table II, p. 310. It includes repro-
ducible durables (excluding consumer durables), inventories, gold and silver, and the
net balance of foreign claims. To derive the series for the other years, we added to or
subtracted from the basic 1880 figure our annual estimates of net capital formation.
The gross capital stock figure in col. 1 begins with an estimate of the net capital
stock of wealth in 1805, also from Goldsmith's series. This, in terms of the concept
mentioned above, amounts to $0.9 billion in 1929 prices. If we assume a ratio of gross
stock to net of about 1.67 (corresponding to a long-term ratio of net capital formation
to gross of 0.60), the gross stock of capital in 1805 is $1.5 billion. The ratio of net to
gross capital formation of 0.6 was based on Table 2; but even a major error in that
figure or in the ratio applied to the 1805 figure for net capital stock to derive gross
capital stock would have minor effects on the totals beginning in 1869.
Goldsmith's figures yield net capital formation from 1805 to 1880 (derived as first
differences in the net stock of capital between the two dates). On the assumption that
net capital formation is 0.6 of gross, we can then estimate gross capital formation for
1805—1880. Adding this total to gross capital stock in 1805 yields the gross capital
stock in 1880. The ratio of the latter to the net capital stock (Goldsmith's total) is, as
should be expected, 1.67. We applied this ratio to our net capital stock total for 1869
to derive the initial estimate of gross capital stock for 1869 in col. 1. With this figure
and our estimates of gross capital formation at hand, we derived the figures for later
dates by successive addition.
The series on gross capital stock net of retirements (col. 2) was derived along lines
similar to those described for gross capital stock in col. 1. The major difference lies in
the ratio of net capital formation to gross, in this case gross net of retirements. On the
basis of the life spans (13 years for producers' durables and 50 years for construction,
the terminal years or decades giyen half weight) and the earlier levels of construction
and producers' durable equipment underlying the capital consumption estimates, we
set the ratio at 0.75; which yields a ratio, in the long run, of gross capital stock net of
retirements to net capital stock of 1.33. With these ratios set, and with the application
of constant life spans, the initial estimate for 1869 in col. 2 was derived and the subse-
quent totals estimated by succeslive addition. These calculations were applied to non-
military construction and equipment alone; for military we assumed retirements to be
equal to consumption.
The population and labor force estimates are the annual series underlying Tables
R-37 and R-39.
times; and the somewhat unrealistic capital stock gross of all con-
sumption, to about 26 times its initial level. The exclusion of military
capital reduces these rates of growth slightly.
2. If the growth of capital stock were caused by growth in numbers—
of total population and of the labor force—and returns to scale were
constant, capital per heaçl and per member of the labor force would
have remained constant during the period. Instead, we observe a
marked growth in capital per person and per member of the labor
force. Net capital stock per head rose, over the period as a whole, to
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about 4 times its initial level, whether or not we include military capi-
tal, i.e., at a rate of about 17 per cent per decade. The rate of growth
for gross capital net of retirements per head was slightly higher. That
for total gross capital per person was materially higher, but the ele-
ment of exaggeration must be borne in mind. Since labor force grew
at somewhat higher rates than total population, the rate of growth of
capital stock per member of the labor force was somewhat lower than
that of capital per person. But even its lowest rate of growth per
decade, for the period as a whole, was 14 per cent (for net capital
stock).
3. The rate of growth declined significantly. This is apparent from
the entries in lines 11 and 12, which show the rate of growth for the
period as a whole, from 1869 to 1955, and for the period terminating
in 1929. In every comparison, the rate of growth for the period in-
cluding the last twenty-seven years was distinctly below that for the
first six decades covered, not only for each total capital stock series,
but also for capital stock per person and per member of the labor
force.
Retardation in the rate of growth of the aggregates is found also
when we study successive wide intervals, not shorter than twenty years,
within the period (lines 13—16). Even for gross capital stock, the rate
of growth in the third interval (from 1909 to 1929) was significantly
lower than in the first two.
4. The retardation in the rate of growth of total capital stock is
to some extent accounted for by a decline in the rate of growth of
population and of the labor force. The entries in columns 4 and 8
record the familiar and well-established fact that the percentage rate
of growth in numbers in the country has been tending downward.
Consequently, the retardation in the rate of growth of capital stock
per capita and per member of the labor force is not as continuous
as that of total stock. The decrease in the rate of growth of stock per
capita—whether net, gross excluding retirements, or gross of all con-
sumption—is not evident until after 1909; and for two of the variants
of stock per member of the labor force, retardation in the rate of
growth does not set in until after 1929. Neither date should be given
too much weight. The important finding is that with the exception
of net capital stock the supply of capital goods per worker grew at a
slightly increasing rate through most of the period, the decline in the
rate of growth emerging only in the most recent interval, 1929 to 1955.
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5. This last finding is of particular interest. Over some sixty years
of the period, capital stock per worker grew at high rates, and except
in the case of net capital stock, at slightly rising rates. It is only after
the 1920's that the growth of capital per worker declined. And the
decline was quite drastic. In the two most realistic series, net capital
and gross capital excluding retirements, the level of capital per mem-
ber of the labor force shows very little growth after 1929. II is true
that the period beginning in 1929 includes the Great Depression; but
on the other hand, it includes also the expansion years of World War II
and a decade of particularly high levels of capital formation following
the conclusion of that war. If we view the average in 1929—1955 as
an approximation to long-term secular levels, we can hardly escape the
conclusion that substantial changes have occurred in the factors that
determine capital formation—a point to be explored further as we
proceed.
With the data in Table 3 it is possible to allocate the growth in
total capital between that part which can be ascribed merely to the
increase in population or in the labor force—on the assumption of a
constant supply of capital per person or per worker—and that which
can be ascribed to the growth in stock per capita or per member of
the labor force. The results f the calculations are given in Table 4.
We assume that the stock per capita or per member of the labor force
remained constant at the 1869 level in the decades that followed, and
that the growth in capital stock was due merely to growth in popu-
lation or labor force. Lines 1 and la, covering the total period, show
that, under such conditions, the growth in total capital stock would
have been only a small fraction of the actual increase. In the case of
stock gross of all consumption, the increase in population accounts for
between one-eighth and oneseventh of the total addition that occurred.
In other words, gross capital formation cumulated over the period
would have been only 12 to 14 per cent of its actual volume. The in-
crease in the labor force, under the conditions assumed, would have
contributed a somewhat greater increase to gross capital stock—about
one-sixth of the increase that occurred. In other words, gross capital
formation under these conditions would have been from 16 to 18 per
cent of its actual volume. In the case of net stock, the hypothetical
contribution of the increase in numbers is somewhat greater—about
one-fifth due to the rise in population, and over one-quarter due to
the rise in labor force. In the case of gross stock, net of retirements,
the percentage contributions are slightly lower.
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TABLE 4
ALLOCATION OF RISE IN CAPITAL STOCK BETWEEN RISE IN POPULATION OR LABOR
FORCE AND RISE IN CAPITAL STOCK PER UNIT, 1869—1955
PROPORTION OP RISE IN
Stock Net of Stock Net of
Gross Capital Capital Retire- Capital Con-
Stock Due to ments Due to sumption Due
Rise in: Rise in: toRisein:
Popu-LaborPopu-LaborPopu-Labor
PERIODS lationForcelationForcelationForce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TOTAL PERIOD
1869—1 955
1. Total capital stock 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.27
Ia. Total capital stock,
excluding military 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.28
SUBPERIODS, TOTAL CAPITAL STOCK
2. 1869—1888 0.36 0.47 0.38 0.50 0.37 0.49
3. 1889—1908 0.29 0.44 0.30 0.45 0.32 0.48
4. 1909—1928 0.33 0.28 0.36 0.31 0.40 0.34
5. 1929—1955 0.37 0.37 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.80
Geometric means,
lines 2—5 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.44 0.50
SUBPERIODS, TOTAL CAPITAL STOCK, EXCLUDING MILITARY
2. 1869—1888 0.36 0.47 0.38 0.50 0.37 0.49
3. 1889—1908 0.29 0.44 0.30 0.45 0.32 0.48
4a. 1909—1928 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.41 0.35
5a. 1929—1955 0.44 0.43 0.83 0.82 0.94 0.94
Geometric means,
lines 2—5a 0.35 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.53
Soustca: Calculated from the data underlying Table 3.
Naturally, the relative contribution of growth in numbers increases
as we shorten the period, largely because the weight of the other
factor—the increase in stock per capita or per member of the labor
force—is cumulated over a shorter period. When we average the re-
suits for the four intervals, each covering twenty years or more, the
contribution of the increase in numbers to the increase in capital
stock ranges from slightly more than one-third to about one-half.
These findings for the intervals, however, are less significant in the
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present connection than those for the period as a whole, which in-
dicate quite clearly that the direct arithmetic contribution of increase
in numbers to capital formation is quite moderate. It is true that
growth of population and of the labor force may have many indirect
influences, which are extremely important in explaining the volume
and growth of capital formation. For example, the wider division of
labor made possible by greater numbers permits specialization, in-
creased productivity, and consequently greater capital formation. But
there are better measures of these ramified effects than the growth in
numbers. The latter, in itself, has contributed too little directly to
capital formation in this country since 1869 to merit much weight in
any explanatory hypotheses, and we must turn to some other proximate
determinants.
There is, however, one significant exception to this statement. The
retardation in the growth of: population and of labor force is quite
marked. According to columns 4 and 8 of Table 3, the rate of growth
of population in 1929—1955 was less than half the rate in 1869—1889;
and the retardation in the rate of growth of the labor force is even
more striking—the rate in 1929—1955 being somewhat over one-third
of that in 1869—1889. Considerable significance could be attributed to
such slowing down in the rate of growth of population and of labor
force in explaining, if only in part, the retardation in the rate of growth
of capital stock, and via the latter, the decline in the rate of growth
of capital formation. We must, therefore, bear in mind that, while
the increase in numbers alone may be quantitatively of little im-
portance in accounting for the volume and rate of growth of capital
formation, the retardation in the rate of growth of population and of
labor force may be of much greater importance in accounting for the
retardation in the rate of growth of gross capital formation, and
thus—for reasons that will become clearer in subsequent discussion—
for the increased proportion!of capital consumption, and for the even
greater retardation in the rate of growth of net capital formation.
Rate of Growth in Gross and in Net National Product
If increase in population and labor force contributes little, directly,
to the growth of capital stock and to the trends in capital formation,
we may find a more important proximate determinant in national
product. However, since national product is an aggregate of which
capital formation is a component, there is a tautological relation be-
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tween the two in the sense that, all other conditions being equal,
changes in capital formation mean identical changes in national prod-
uct. One could argue that to try to explain trends in capital formation
on the basis of their relation to trends in national product is like ex-
plaining a phenomenon by the phenomenon itself. And yet we feel
that there is some meaning in relating capital formation, either di-
rectly or in the form of the cumulated stock, to national product.
The reason for this "feeling" can be easily stated. Capital forma-
tion represents additions to capital stock, which is an important tool
in producing national income, output, or product. Capital formation
also represents national savings, and is thus a fraction of national prod-
uct. Hence changes in capital stock will affect national product, and
these expected effects may be the raison d'être for capital formation
and may, therefore, explain it. In turn, changes in national product,
the pool from which capital formation is drawn, will naturally affect
the magnitude of capital formation. In this two-way relation between
capital formation and national product the tautological element is
conceptually removed by the introduction of a disparity in the time
reference, although in the statistical estimates used here, the time
periods are far too long and the data too crude for the lag and lead
allowances to be significant and feasible. When capital formation is
viewed as additions to tools for turning out national product, the
latter is conceived as being produced in the future and capital for-
mation as taking place in the present—governed, as it were, by future
product expectations. When capital formation is viewed as the saved
portion of national product, the latter is regarded as having been pro.
duced in the past, and capital formation as taking place in the present,
since it is only realized product that can give rise to real savings. Much
of the discussion in the rest of this chapter will deal with these two
relations between capital formation and national product.
As a prelude to that discussion, it will be helpful to observe the
long-term trends in national product—total, per capita, and per mem-
ber of the labor force (Table 5). These summary measures, shown in
several variants, distinguish gross and net national product, the net dif-
fering from the gross in that current capital consumption has been
deducted. In Appendixes A and B we present three variants of gross
and net national product (or national income, the two terms being
used interchangeably here), each variant including identical estimates
of gross and net capital formation but each differing in its estimate of
flow of goods to consumers. Variant I is based on the original estimates
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TABLE 5
RATE OF GROWTH IN NATIONAL PRODUCT,: 1929 PRICES, GROSS AND NET,






































6. Line 1 to line 4
7. Line I to line 5
Total, excluding military
6a. Line I to line 4a
7a. Line I to line 5a
8. Line I to line 2
9. Line 2 to line 3









14.6 37.7 17.2 13.7
16.8 38.7 18.5 15.7
14.1 37.5 17.0 13.6





18.4 52.1 24.0 17.0
15.0 39.9 17.7 14.8
10.0 24.4 10.9 9.7
16.1 30.9 16.5 16.0
Total
VOLUMES AVERAGES PER YEAR
1.1869—1888 $ 14.4$ 288$ 854
2.1889—1908 34.0 454 1,196
3.1909—1928 67.3 636 1,594




















8. Line I to line 2
9a. Line 2 to line 3a
lOa. Line 3a to line 4a



















Total Per of Total Per of
Periods (billions)CapitaLabor Force(billions)CapitaLabor Force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variant III
VOLUMES, AVERAGES PER YEAR
Total
12. 1869—1888 $ 14.7$ 296$ 874 $ 13.3$ 267$ 792
13. 1889—1908 34.9 466 1,226 30.9 412 1,087
14. 1909—1928 69.7 659 1,652 61.4 580 1,456
15. 1929—1955 122.3 882 2,158 106.0 765 1,870
16. 1946—1955 172.3 1,121 2,777 147.2 957 2,372
Total, excluding military
14a. 1909—1928 69.1 654 1,639 61.2 578 1,451
iSa. 1929—1955 119.1 860 2,101 105.2 759 1,855
16a. 1946—1955 169.1 1,099 2,724 149.8 974 2,414
PERCENTAGE RATE OF GROWTH PER DECADE, TOTAL PERIOD
Total
17. Line 12 to line 15 39.6 18.8 15.3 38.6 18.0 14.5
18. Line 12 to line 16 40.7 20.3 17.4 39.6 19.4 16.5
Total, excluding military
17a. Line 12 to line 15a 39.0 18.3 14.8 38.5 17.9 14.3
18a. Line 12 to line 16a 40.4 20.0 17.1 39.9 19.7 16.7
PERCENTAGE RATE OF GROWTH PER DECADE, SUBPERIODS
Total
19. Line 12 to line 13 53.9 25.5 18.5 52.2 24.2 17.2
20. Line 13 to line 14 41.4 18.9 16.0 41.0 18.6 15.7
21. Line 14 to line 15 27.1 13.3 12.0 26.2 12.5 11.2
22. Line 14 to line 16 32.7 18.1 17.6 31.4 16.9 16.5
Total, excluding military
19. Line 12 to line 13 53.9 25.5 18.5 52.2 24.2 17.2
20a. Line 13 to line 14a 40.9 18.5 15.6 40.8 18.4 15.5
21a. Line 14a to line 15a 26.1 12.3 11.1 25.9 12.3 11.0
22a. Line 14a to line 16a 32.2 17.6 17.2 32.3 17.7 17.2
(continued)
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TABLE 5 (concluded)
Gross National Product Net NationalProduct
Per Member Per Member
Total Per of Total Per of
Periods (billions)Capita Labor Force(billions)Capita




VOLUMES, AVERAGES PER YEAR
23.1869—1888 $ 14.7$ 296$ 876 $ 13.4$ 269 $794
24.1889—1908 35.5 475 1,250 31.5 422 1,110
25.1909—1928 72.0 681 1,707 63.7 603 1,511
26.1929—1955 136.8 987 2,414 120.5 870 2,126
27.1946—1955 190.3 1,237 3,066 165.2 1,074 2,662
PERCENTAGE RATE OP ROWTH PER DECADE, TOTAL PERIOD
28.Line 23 to line 26 42.0 20.9 17.3 41.4 20.3 16.8
29.Line 23 to line 27 42.7 22.0 19.0 41.8 21.2 18.3
PERCENTAGE RATE 01' GROWTH PER DECADE, SUEPERTODS
30.Line 23 to line 24 55.3 26.7 19.5 53.7 25.3 18.3
31.Line 24 to line 25 42.4 19.7 16.8 42.1 19.6 16.7
32.Line 25 to line 26 31.4 17.1 15.9 31.2 16.9 15.6
33.Line 25 to line 27 35.5 20.5 20.1 34.7 19.8 19.4
SOURCE:
Columns 1 and 4
Lines 1—3 and 12—14. Geometric means of successive decade averages in Table R-1 2.
Lines 4 and 15. Weighted geometric means of decade averages for 1929—1938 and
1939—1948 (from Table R-12) and of the average for 1949—1955 (from Table R-2).
Lines 5 and 16. From Table R-2 (arithmetic means of annual estimates).
Lines 3a—5a and 14a—16a. For military, see notes to Table 2.
Lines 23—27. Average value of gross national product is given for 1929—1938 and later
years in Table A-6, col. 2 and extrapolated for earlier years by applying to Variant III
the ratio of the Commerce series to: Variant III in 1929—1938, and assuming a 0.8 per
decade decline in the ratio (as suggested by the movement of the ratio since 1929 in
Table A-3). The net national product series is calculated by deducting from the gross
national product estimates the difference between cols. I and 4, lines 1—5.
Columns 2, 3, 3, and 6
For estimates of population and labor force see notes to Table 3. The decade averages
of national product were divided by the decade averages of population and of labor
force, and then geometric means Of the decade averages of per-Capita or per-worker
product were calculated for the longer periods in the same fashion as for total national
product.
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derived by the income-payments method in National income and Its
Composition, 1919—1938. Services (and hence total flow of goods to
consumers) are approximated by subtracting from national income
independently derived estimates of cost of commodities to consumers
and of net capital formation. Variant I is extrapolated forward from
the 1930's by the appropriate items in the national income accounts
of the Department of Commerce. Variant II retains all the commodity
flow series of Variant I, but the services component is measured di-
rectly, not as a residual. Variant III is based upon the commodity flow
and services estimates of the Department of Commerce for the years
beginning with 1929, but only those that reflect the concepts under-
lying Variants I and II. These components of flow of goods to con-
sun-iers are then extrapolated back to 1919 by the commodity com-
ponents of Variant I and the services component of Variant II.
Table S shows Variants I and III, but to reduce detail, Variant II,
which is fairly close to I and III, is omitted. Conceptually all three
variants are identical: they are intended to exclude the intermediate
product of government activities. They differ only in respect to the
estimating procedures. A more important feature of Table 5 is the
inclusion of measures for another concept of national product—that
used presently by the Department of Commerce. Its chief difference
from Variants I and III (and II) lies in the treatment of all govern-
ment expenditures on commodities and services as final product, and
hence the inclusion of those expenditures in national product along
with private capital formation and flow of goods to ultimate consumers.
This profusion of variants of national product may be embarrassing,
and it certainly does not make for easy discussion and understanding.
The retention of these variants and different concepts is not due to a
capricious desire to befuddle the unwary reader, but rather serves a
purpose. Use of Variants I and III is warranted because it indicates
that, even for one definition of national product, justifiable differences
in statistical procedure may result in different rates and patterns of
growth. Use of the Commerce national product total serves as a re-
minder of the important differences in judgment of what constitutes
net or gross output. It shows that these differences inevitably mean dif-
ferent levels and patterns of long-term trends in the volume of output
and, for that matter, of capital. In the attempt to arrive at some ac-
3SimonKuznets, assisted by Lillian Epstein and Elizabeth Jenks (New York,
NEER, 1941).
4Formore detailed discussion and comparison see Appendix A.
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ceptable record of long-term trends in such aggregative totals as na-
tional income or capital it is important to bear in mind the possible
effects of differences in concept and statistical procedures, lest we as-
sign too much weight to the results of a specific conceptual or statistical
decision.
With these cautions in mind, we can now list the major findings sug-
gested by Table 5 on rate of growth of national product.
1. For the period as a whole—from the first two decades, 1869—1888,
to either the last long period, 1929—1955, or to the post-World War II
years—the rise in national product has been impressive. From 1869—
1888 to 1946—1955 the volume rose to ten or more times its initial
level. The rate of growth per' decade ranges from 37.5 to almost 43
per cent—depending upon the terminal period chosen, the inclusion
or exclusion of military items (in this case only military capital forma-
tion), the deduction or inclusion of capital consumption, and the con-
cept followed. The differences in statistical procedure and even in
scope have relatively little effect on the average rate of growth over
the period as a whole.
2. Much of this impressive growth in national product can be directly
associated with growth in population and in labor force. For product per
capita and per member of the labor force, the average percentage rate
of increase was from about one-third to one-half of that for the total:
that in product per capita ranged from 17 to 22 per cent per decade;
that in product per member f the labor force, from somewhat under
14 to 19 per cent. But the cumulation of such rates over more than
six or seven decades produces a marked rise in product per capita or
per worker. Thus, net national product per capita in 1929—1955 was
about three times its 1869—1888 level; and net national product per
worker grew almost as much. A tripling of the average standard of
living per head in slightly over six decades—and this is essentially what
is implied—is an extraordinary performance, in that there are few
equally long historical perio4s when it could have occurred, and there
are almost no countries in which such a rise occurred from levels that,
in the initial period, were already so high.
3. In observing the rates of growth for successive intervals within
the period, the last interval terminating in 1929—1955 or 1946—1955,
we find that for total product, whether gross or net and whatever the
variant, the rate of growth declined. Invariably, the average level for
the post-World War II decade, 1946—1955, reflects a higher rate of
growth per decade from 1909—1928 than that for the longer period
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1929—1955. But even if we use this more favorable showing of the post-
World War II decade, the rate of growth per decade is lower than in
the interval from 1889—1908 to 1909—1928. And there is room for argu-
ment as to whether the average for 1946—1955 represents a long-term
secular level, rather than a position above it reflecting some transiently
favorable conditions of the immediate post-World War II years. This
problem of interpretation of the secular significance of the recent
decade requires careful examination, best undertaken at a later stage in
the analysis.
4. As might have been expected from our earlier discussion, much
of the retardation in the rate of growth of total product can be di-
rectly associated with retardation in the rate of growth of population
and of labor force. As a consequence, for product per capita or per
member of the labor force, no sweeping conclusion concerning retarda-
tion in the rate of growth can be made; and the evidence must be
summarized with careful attention to detail.
5. If 1929—1955 is taken as the terminal period, we find a consistent
decline in the rate of growth of product per capita and per member
of the labor force—for Variants I and III and the Commerce concept,
gross and net product, including and excluding military. The only
qualification is that for the Commerce concept, in which the expansion
of government activities is tantamount to an increase in final product,
the decline from the rate of growth of product per capita and per
worker for the interval 1889—1908 to 1909—1928 to that for the inter-
val 1909—1928 to 1929—1955 is rather moderate (see lines 31 and 32).
6. If we use the high level of the 1946—1955 decade as the terminal
datum, the results change. The decline in the rate of growth of prod-
uct per capita and per worker between the first and the second intervals
is not affected, of course. But the retardation over the interval between
1909—1928 and 1946—1955 (i.e., when we skip the intervening depres-
sion and war years) disappears. In other words, from the secular level
in 1909—1928 to the level in 1946—1955, treated here as secular, the rate
of growth in product per capita and per worker is almost as high as,
or higher than, the rate of growth from 1889—1908 to 1909—1928.
7. The conclusions suggested just above may be restated somewhat
more vividly. If we assume that the depression of the 1930's is canceled
by the expansions that preceded and followed it, and regard the
longer-term averages as truly representative secular levels, we find
retardation in the rate of growth not only of total income, but also
of product per head and per worker. If, however, we omit the depres-
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sion and the war years, and regard the 1946—1955 averages as secular
levels, there is no clear case for retardation in the rate of growth of
product per capita or per worker.
The emphasis above on ascertaining the existence or absence of
retardation in the secular rate: of growth may at first seem puzzling.
But it should be no more puzzling than our interest in the absolute
level of income or in its percentage rate of growth. Given an initial
level of product or income, it makes a difference whether, in the process
of secular growth, the average rate over a long period is 5 or 15 per
cent per decade: a higher rate not only means much greater volume
with the passage of time, but, in the present connection, it may also
be associated with the volume of capital formation, and may in turn
have an effect on it. But given an average rate of growth per decade
over a long period, we must also know whether this is an average of
relatively constant rates—about the same at the beginning and at the
end of the period—or whether it is an average of rates that systemati-
cally decline or rise. For consistent retardation or acceleration is a
signal that some process is continuously at work modifying the factors
that determine the average rate of growth; and this calls for an in-
vestigation of these factors to see whether the consistency observed in
the past is likely to continue into the future.
Relation of Capital to Output
If capital formation is necessary to maintain or increase the stock of
capital goods required to produce desired output, the possibilities of
explaining the level of and : trend in capital formation lie in a com-
parison of capital stock with output—on either an aggregative or com-
ponent basis. The line of reasoning, following the Harroci-Domar
model, can be briefly stated;. Assume that technological and other re-
quirements call for a given ratio of capital stock to desired annual
output, say the ratio of 3 to :1. Then if population and its desired level
of per capita output both increase, the required rate of growth of total
output or national product (i.e., increased population multiplied by
increased per capita product) is, let us say, x per cent per year. To
maintain the required ratio of capital to output of 3 to 1 with the x
per cent of growth of output calls for a growth in capital stock equal to
Sx per cent of annual aggregate output. Hence, under the assumptions
just stated, capital formation—additions to the stock of capital—equals
Sx per cent of national product (which determines the level of the
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capital formation proportion to national product), and the rate of
percentage growth in capital stock equals the rate of growth in na-
tional product. In turn, the percentage rate of growth of capital stock,
if observed over successive periods, will reveal the rate of growth of
capital formation, i.e., of additions to capital stock. If we can either
explain or assume the level and rate of growth of population and of
product per capita, we can, given a constant (or changing) capital-
output ratio, derive the level and rate of growth of capital formation.
While this is obviously a highly oversimplified view, it is sufficient
to indicate the broad rationale for our interest in the capital-output
ratio as a measure that may advance our understanding of the factors
that determine the volume of and rate of growth in capital formation.
But in trying to apply the schema to the estimates, we are immediately
confronted with specific questions. Should we use gross capital stock
or stock adjusted for actual retirements as the numerator of the ratio
we wish to study? Or should we take capital stock net of all accumu-
lated depreciation? What measure of aggregate output should we
use as the denominator—national product, as we define it or as the
Department of Commerce defines it, and should it be gross or net of
depreciation? These specific questions have wider implications that
bear upon the whole meaning and usefulness of the capital-output
ratios in the analysis; but these implications can be discussed more
effectively after studying the statistical value of the ratios. For the
present therefore, the purpose of these questions is merely to indicate
the reason for the several sets of capital-output ratios given in Table 6.
In one set, gross capital stock is related to gross national product,
Variant I, and the Department of Commerce concept. We shall hence-
forth omit Variant III to reduce detail; besides, Variant I and the
Commerce totals show the widest differences, whereas those among our
three variants do not affect the findings significantly. In another set,
gross capital stock, net of retirements, is related to net national prod-
uct. It might have been more justifiable to relate it to gross national
product, net of retirements, but the resulting ratios would have differed
only slightly from those shown. In the third set of ratios net capital
stock is related to net national product.
The capital-output ratios are calculated for the successive decades,
the numerator being the geometric mean of the capital stock at the
beginning and end of the decade, and the denominator, the annual
average of national product during that decade. Both numerator and
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sensitivity of price movements: of current output than of reported
valuation of capital stock. The decadal ratios thus obtained are aver-
aged over longer periods to convey some idea of the long-term trends.
The results of these calculatioEs are now summarized.
1. The ratios of net capital stock to net national product range
from 2.5 to close to 4 (disregarding the levels over 4 in the decade of
the 1930's when output and rates of utilization of capital were distinctly
below the secular levels). The capital-output ratios are somewhat
higher if we take capital stock net of retirements but gross of deprecia-
tion on assets still in existence: they range from slightly over 3.5 to
almost 5.5, again excluding the abnormal decade of the 1930's. Nat-
urally, if we deal with capital stock gross of all consumption, the
ratios tend to be still higher, even though we use gross national prod-
iict rather than net as the denominator: they range from 4.5 to al-
most 7.
2. Of greatest interest here are the movements in the capital-
output ratios over time. Have they been constant in the long run, sug-
gesting the existence of some deep-seated and persistent forces? Or if
there have been marked trends, what have been the direction, timing,
and magnitude of these trençls?
In answering these questions, the longer period averages are of most
bearing. Over periods as short as decades, the effects of business cycles
and similar short-term disturbances may still be marked—on the flu.
merator and perhaps more so on the denominator. If, then, we concen-
trate attention on lines 10—14, we find that the net capital stock ratios
tended to rise from the first long suhperiod, 1869—1888, to the third,
1909—1928, and then declined, regardless of whether the terminal period
is 1929—1955, or 1939—1955, that is, omitting the decade of the 1930's.
Two aspects of this long ris and subsequent decline in the net capital-
output ratios should be nyted. First, this movement is observed in
both variants. Second, although the capital-output ratio for the last
subperiod, 1929—1955, is bolstered by the abnormally low level of
the denominator in the 1933's, it is still lower than that for 1909—1928.
An almost identical pattern is observed for the ratios of gross capital,
excluding retirements, to net national product: the same distinct rise
from 1869—1888 to 1909—1928, the same distinct decline to 1929—1955,
even more distinct if we limit the last subperiod to 1939—1955. The
somewhat unrealistic gross capital-gross national product ratios, how-
ever, reveal a different long-term pattern. These ratios continue to
rise throughout, if we use 1929—1955 as the last subperiod. But even
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here, the rise from 1909—1928 to 1929—1955 is negligible when the
"grosser" Commerce concept product total is used as the denominator;
and it disappears or becomes negligible for both variants when we
omit the depressed 1930's and use 1939—1955 as the last subperiod.
3. This reversal in the long-term movement of the capital-output
ratios is but a result of differential changes in the rate of growth of
capital stock and of national product, commented upon in connection
with Tables 3 and 5. The rate of growth of both capital stock and
national product declined over the long period beginning with 1869.
But until the end of the 1920's the growth of capital stock more than
kept pace with the growth of national product, whereas in recent
decades the sharp decline in the proportional volume of capital form a-
tion reduced the growth of capital stock far more than it did the long-
term level of national product. Both numerator and denominator
were still rising during the last subperiod, as they were during the
earlier ones; but the retardation in the growth of capital was much
greater than that in the growth of product.
The measures in Table 6 are average ratios, relating total capital
stock to total national product. But we are interested in capital forma-
tion, i.e., additions to or changes in capital stock; and these are per-
haps more directly affected by changes in national product. It may be
helpful, therefore, to calculate the marginal capital-output ratios, i.e.,
the ratios of changes in capital stock to changes in national product.
In this calculation, the results of which are shown in Table 7, we use
capital stock at the mid-point of a decade and average annual national
product for each decade, dividing the change in the successive intervals
in the capital stock totals by the change in the successive decadal levels
of national product.5 The variants parallel those in Table 6; but in
grouping the decadal intervals into longer ones, we have intentionally
5Asalready suggested, it would have been more defensible to allow some lag
between additions to capital stock and those to output, on the premise that some
time may elapse between installation of additional capital equipment and its initial
contribution to additional output. In the present calculations no significant time
lag is allowed for.
The reason is that no data for any acceptable estimate of the lag are available.
Furthermore, unless the lag is substantial—and we have no basis for such an as-
sumption—the extension of the interval over which changes are being compared
would reduce to insignificance the proportional effect of the lag on the capital-output
ratio. Since we are interested in the long-term capital-output ratios, the lag problem
is of little importance here, unless it is of the type discussed in Chapter 4, i.e., of
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assembled them in such a way as to distinguish the period after the
1920's from the earlier ones.
4. The marginal ratios for the decadal intervals are quite variable.
Even if we disregard the extreme results for the intervals affected by
the depression of the 1930's and the decade immediately following, the
variations in the marginal ratios are far wider than those in the average
ratios. This was to be expected.
5. Of more importance here are the ratios for the longer intervals.
These reflect the pattern of movement over time already shown by the
average ratios in Table 6—the rise to the 1920's and the decline there-
after. The only modification here is in timing: for net capital stock,
the marginal ratios cease to rise, or show a decline, after the second in-
terval, and this is true also for gross capital stock, net of retirements,
excluding the military. But of more interest is the fact that the recent
decline is much greater in the marginal than in the average ratios.
In other words, the downturn in the capital-output ratios in the re-
cent period, that is, after the 1920's, is much more prominent in the
marginal ratios—a mathematical necessity, since reversal in the direc-
tion of a line means a greater change in the first differences. But this
again points up the question how we can evaluate such a marked
turn in the relation between changes in national product and in
capital formation.
After this brief summary of the statistical evidence on nationwide
capital-product ratios, we address ourselves to the wider implications
of the measures, and ask what ratios of this type can contribute to
our understanding of the factors that determine levels of and trends
in capital formation. Such a broad question can hardly be treated
exhaustively; but we touch upon a few major points that should
guide us in further analysis.
1. One of the apparently important aspects of the ratioisthe
underlying notion of technological necessity or constraint—the in-
dispensability of capital in the production of goods, and hence the
implied indispensability of capital formation in the production of
additional quantities of goods. If this notion is valid, further analysis
should stress the technological factors that may have determined the
levels of the capital-product ratios indicated in Tables 6 and 7, and
the technological changes that may have accounted for the indicated
movement of the ratios over time.
This element of technological necessity or constraint actually does
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• exist, as is evident if we consider some specific product. For instance,
transportation services of the speed and convenience and at the price
that railroads provide cannot be supplied unless there is antecedent
capital accumulation in the form of railroad stock, rolling equipment,
and so on. The same is true of thousands of products that cannot be
turned out by direct labor alone. If we envisage national output as
a congeries of specific products and assume that some or many of these
specific products literally cannot be produced by direct labor alone,
without some reproducible capital, it can be argued that the pre-
existence of some capital stock is a necessary condition. In this sense
some minimum positive capital-output ratio must exist. But even this
conclusion is contingent upon the assumption that national output or
product is not limited to items that are producible by natural resources
and labor alone.
2. The minimum capital-output ratio assumed above, however, tells
us little concerning the actual level of the capital-output ratio except
that it is above zero. How large it would or should be is less a matter
of technology than of economics; and the greater the economic ele-
ment, the greater the doubt that the capital-output ratio is an illumi-
nating approach to the analysis of capital formation.
Our reasons for discounting the purely technological constraints are
numerous, but one should serve to illustrate our point. To provide
railroad services requires some minimum of capital stock: but the
track can be of solid and heavy construction or it can be two streaks
of rust over the plain; the rolling equipment can be brand-new and
modern, or it can be purchased secondhand and boast no new features
whatever. In short, wide variations in the real value of the numerator
are possible—naturally above some rock bottom minimum—and these
variations will be largely governed by economic considerations. Like-
wise, there may be appreciable variations in the denominator. Under
certain conditions, it may be advantageous to run the equipment—
the capital—continuously, and the total product (say, during a year) to
which the capital stock is related may thus be quite large, and the
capital-output ratio low. Under others, it may be more advantageous
to run the equipment at lower capacity and, with a correspondingly
lower output, the capital-output ratio will be high. Thus, even for a
specific product, and even disregarding cyclical fluctuations, it is per-
fectly possible, indeed quite realistic, to expect that different economic
conditions (say, in different countries and epochs, and without regard
to any technological changes) will cause a wide range in capital-output
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ratios, all above the minimum dictated by purely technological con-
straints.
3. It is because of the possible dominance of these economic elements
in the determination of the capital-output ratios that those in which
the net capital stock is the numerator have more meaning. When we
deduct depreciation we allow the economic elements of opportunity
cost to operate in determining the rate of utilization of capital that
may still be physically present: the proportion of net to gross capital
stock is the economically rational long-term rate of utilization of gross
capacity. Hence in relating net capital stock to output we are, in fact,
relating capital stock weightd by its rational rate of capacity utiliza-
tion, whereas, in relating gross capital stock to output the stock is
treated as a congeries of physical units whose total capacity is not
utilized. For this reason, the behavior of the resulting net capital stock
ratios may be explained more easily than the gross ratios.
4. If, with a given technology, economic factors may produce wide
variations in the ratio of caitaI to output for a single product, the
economic—as distinct from purely technological—factors must have
even greater effects when we deal with a wide congeries of products,
among which there can be substitution. If, to continue the earlier il-
lustration, we consider freight transportation services, there is a choice
among railroads, trucks, and sometimes water transport, and in this
choice the different capital-output ratios, or rather the implied dif-
ferences in relative cost of capital, may play a part. Thus, if national
product is regarded as response to a basket of broadly defined needs—
sustenance, clothing, shelter, transportation, and so forth—with specific
goods substitutable for each other in satisfying each major category of
needs, the existing technology admits of wide differences in the mini-
mum ratio of capital stock to output; and related economic factors
widen the range of these differences.
It follows that technology, as a constraining factor, accounts for but
a minor part of our problem. To put it simply: given a current level
of national income and a tock of technological knowledge, the "re-
quired" capital—the stock indispensable for the production of that
national income total, brdadly subdivided into major final product
categories—would be but a small part of the actual capital stock except
in the most underdeveloped countries. Even if we coupled the given
total national product with some minimum level of product per capita,
reference to existing technology would yield—under different economic
conditions—a wide range ol possible capital-product ratios. This can be
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clearly seen when one observes the framework of the "engineering"
estimates of capital-output ratios: they are calculable only on the basis
of detailed specifications of economic conditions—costs of labor, trans-
portation, etc. In short, technological considerations do little to ex-
plain why the nationwide ratio of capital to output should be 3 to 1,
and not 1 to 1, or 10 to 1. And insofar as the explanation lies in eco-
nomic rather than technological constraints, the direction of further
search may be more clearly suggested by other statistical relations,
which do not acquire their meaning from technological implications.
5. What has just been said about the bearing of technological fac-
tors on capital-output ratios at a point of time applies also to trends
over time. True, technological considerations may provide some hy-
potheses as to the probable course of long-term movements in capital-
output ratios, and hence of volumes of capital formation. Thus, all
other conditions being equal, the long-term trend in net capital-output
ratios should be downward: "replacement" being substitution of more
efficient tools, it should be continuously possible to produce greater
output with the same or even smaller net capital stock. On the other
hand, many technological changes that result in the creation of new
products and new tools may raise—at least for a while—the nationwide
capital-output ratio, either by requiring more elaborate tools which
embody resources that are in a higher ratio to current annual output,
or by stimulating expansion of durable capital which for some time
is in advance of the growth of final output. In fact, in subsequent dis-
cussion of the patterns of capital formation in the major industrial
sectors of the economy, we shall use hypotheses based largely on tech-
nological considerations.
But granting the usefulness of these hypotheses, one may still doubt
that technological factors are dominant in determining the long-term
trends in nationwide capital formation, or nationwide capital-output
ratios, if by technology we mean inventions and improvements asso-
ciated with the stock of engineering and other knowledge. For eco-
nomic and other considerations—changing pressures and forms of
organization—exercise a major influence on the trends as well as on
the levels of the capital-output ratios. Repeatedly in the past, great
improvements have been effected in utilization of capital under con-
ditions in which the technological framework has remained un-
changed—as in the United States during the 1930's. In the course of
its long-term economic growth, a nation can choose between high and
low capital-output industries, and its choice will be made in the light
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of availabilities of resources for capital formation, that is, largely in
terms of the costs of withdrawing them from current consumption.
With such a choice, and the changing conditions that affect it, long-
term trends in nationwide capital-output ratios may well reflect trends
in the supply of savings much more than trends in capital presumably
required technologically by some pattern of relations between specific
baskets of final products and capital indispensable for producing them.
6. The comments above are not meant to minimize the importance
of technological processes and changes, and of considerations and
hypotheses based upon them, in the analysis of capital formation and
economic growth. In fact, we hope they will prove fruitful at a later
stage in the analysis when, having dealt as best we can with the de-
terminants of the over-all nationwide rate of capital formation, and
of the long-term trends in the nationwide levels, we deal with the
separate capital using sectOrs. At that point, the time sequence of
technological change in these sectors, and their different levels of
capital-output ratios may help to explain the changing apportionment
of nationwide capital formation among major user sectors. Also, if
we were concerned with the explanation of trends in total national
product, technological changes (additions to the stock of knowledge)
would play a major part in the explanation. But in the problem before
us here—the attempt to explain the levels of and trends in nationwide
capital formation—we find the technological factors overlaid and dom-
inated by a variety of economic and social factors. More specifically,
we doubt that pushing the analysis into consideration of the capital-
output ratios for types of industries or products would add much to
the explanation of the levels and trends in countrywide volumes of
capital formation. This conclusion, which reflects the view that the
observed capital-output ratios are economic rather than technological
measures, leads to the inference that the ratios are radically incom-
plete in their rationale, in that they do not lead to proper emphasis
on the supply of savings—a major factor determining them. In view
of the importance of this factor, the technologically colored plausi-
bility of the capital-output ratios is likely to lead us away from rather
than toward the forces that determine—at least on a nationwide basis—
the levels and trends in capital formation. To direct our attention to
these forces, we must restate the relation between capital formation and
national product, and regroup our totals.
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Capital Formation and Savings-Income Proportions
The discussion above has indicated the possible importance of viewing
capital formation as the saved part of current product, and of directing
attention to the factors that govern savings-income proportions and
may determine, with changes in income, the levels of capital formation
and its trends. This obviously involves calculating the share of gross
capital formation in gross national product, and of net capital forma-
tion in net product. The shares for the several variants of national
product are shown in Table 8. Again, for continuity with the pre-
ceding discussion, the underlying totals are in constant prices.
Over the successive decades the proportion of gross capital forma-
tion to gross national product shows a fair degree of stability through
the decade of the 1920's. It ranges from somewhat over 20 per cent to
26 per cent in the two variants, and, when averaged for periods of not
less than twenty years, shows no significant trend before the 1930's.
This constancy for some six decades at a level averaging somewhat
below one-quarter is one of the few unchanging trends in our analysis
so far.
After the 1920's the movement in the proportion of gross capital
formation to gross national product is more erratic. In both variants
there is a significant drop during the depressed decade of the 1930's,
and the subsequent movement is greatly affected by military capital
formation. If we include the latter, the proportion after the 1930's is
only slightly lower than that preceding the 1930's—at least in Variant I.
If we exclude the military, the proportion of gross capital formation
even after the 1930's is distinctly lower than that prevailing from 1869—
1878 through 1919—1928. On the whole, we can conclude that after
some six decades of relative stability, the gross capital formation pro-
portion declined, particularly noticeably if we exclude military capital
formation.
The stability in the gross capital formation proportion can be seen
as a combination of two opposite trends: in both variants the propor-
tion of capital consumption to gross national product rises, and that of
net capital formation declines, the latter particularly after 1908. Net
capital formation tends to decline not only as a proportion of gross na-
tional product but also as a proportion of net national product. How-
ever, the decline is not conspicuous until the 1909—1918 decade. From
about 15 per cent of net national product during the first four decades,
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TABLE8
OFCAPITAL FORMATION IN NATIONAL PRODUCT, BASED ON
VOLUMES IN 1929 PRICES, 1869—1955
Per Cent of







































9.5 13.9 23.4 15.4
9.8 13.1 22.9 14.5
12.1 14.0 26.0 15.9
11.3 12.9 24.2 14.6
112.3 11.2 23.4 12.7









15.5 4.9 20.4 5.8
12.3 10.3 22.6 11.7
11.5 10.4 21.9 11.8
12.6 1.8 14.4 2.1
12.1 3.7 15.9 4.3









12.3 10.6 22.8 12.0
14.1 4.2 18.3 4.9
9.6 13.5 23.2 15.0
11.7 13.4 25.1 15.2
11.9 10.4 22.2 11.8
12.4 3.6 16.0 4.1
(continued)
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TABLE 8 (concluded)














14. 1869—1878 9.3 13.7 22.9 15.1
15. 1879—1888 9.5 12.7 22.2 14.0
16. 1889—1898 11.6 13.5 25.1 15.2
17. 1899—1908 10.7 12.3 23.0 13.8
18. 1909—1918 11.5 10.5 22.1 11.9
19. 1919—1928 11.4 9.2 20.6 10.4
20. 1929—1938 11.8 1.6 13.4 1.9
21. 1939—1948 11.2 4.8 16.0 5.4
22. 1946—1955 13.2 4.1 17.3 4.8
Longer Periods (averages
of percentages)
23. 1869—1888 9.4 13.2 22.6 14.6
24. 1889—1908 11.2 12.9 24.0 14.5
25. 1909—1928 11.4 9.8 21.4 11.2
26. 1929—1955 11.9 3.4 15.3 3.9
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
SOURCE: Gross and net national product: Decade averages given in or calculated from
Tables R-2 and R-12 (see also notes to Table 5).
Capital consumption and capital formation: Decade averages given in or calculated from
Tables R-5, R-8, R-15, and R-17.
For each decade, the percentage was calculated from the arithmetic mean of abso-
lutes, not as the arithmetic mean of the percentage for each year in the decade.
The averages of percentages in lines 10—13, lOa—13a, and 23—26, were derived from
the decadal entries in the lines above. For 1929—1955 we computed the weighted mean
of the percentage for 1929—1938, 1939—1948, and the seven-year period 1949—1955.
the proportion of net capital formation drops to between 11.2 and 12
per cent in 1909—1928, is catastrophically affected by the depression
of the 1930's, and in the prosperous decade, 1946—1955, constitutes only
4.8 to 5.8 per cent.
If we view these capital formation shares as savings proportions,
there is one obvious limitation to the evidence in Table 8: it relates
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to volumes in constantprices. Conversionto constant prices is useful
if our interest lies in the allocation of real resources between flow of
goods to consumers and additions to capital stock. Our interest here
lies, however, in the allocation of money income (including the pro-
portionately small amount of income in kind) between that used for
consumption purchases and that constituting savings. Since decisions
by individuals and firms between spending and saving are perhaps
more closely related to money income, it may be more useful to study
capital formation or nationwide savings proportions for totals in cur-
rent prices. For this reason we include here, for the first time in our
discussion, estimates based on totals in current prices (Table 9).
The proportions based on the totals in current prices show move-
ments somewhat different fr9m those in the proportions based on the
constant price totals, the reason being that the price trend in capital
formation (affected largely by construction) shows a somewhat greater
long-term rise than that in national product as a whole. We now list
the findings based on values in current prices.
1. The proportion of gros capital formation to gross national prod-
uct is relatively constant, at a level close to or somewhat above 20 per
cent in both Variant I andthe Commerce series. For the longer ter-
minal period, 1929—1955, there is some decline in Variant I if we ex-
clude the military, and in the Commerce estimates even in the total.
For the decade 1946—1955, however, the level in each set of estimates
is about the same as that revailing before the 1930's. Thus, by and
large, one can conclude that, for totals in current prices, there has
been a rough long-term constancy in the gross capital formation pro-
portion—at about or somewhat over 20 per cent.
2. The proportion of capital consumption to gross national product
rises, both in Variant I and in the Commerce series. For the longer
periods, the rise is from somewhat over 8 to 13.3 or 15.6 per cent. As
we shall see in the next chapter, it is a reflection partly of the retarda-
tion in the rate of growth of capital formation itself, partly of the
shift from the longer-lived construction to the shorter-lived producers'
equipment.
3. The proportion of net capital formation to net national product
is fairly constant until 1909—1918: between 13 and 13.9 per cent in
Variant I and between 12.4 and 13.2 per cent in the Commerce series.
It drops down to either ll.8 or 10.8 per cent in 1909—1928, and declines
drastically thereafter. The highest recent rate, 9.0 per cent, is for
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TABLE 9
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN NATIONAL PRODUCT, BASED ON
VOLUMES IN CURRENT PRICES, 1869—1955











(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIANT I
Total
1. 1869—1878 8.0 12.3 20.3 13.4
2. 1879—1888 8.7 11.8 20.6 13.0
3. 1889—1898 10.7 12.5 23.1 13.9
4. 1899—1908 10.5 12.4 22.8 13.8
5. 1909—1918 11.5 10.6 22.1 12.0
6. 1919—1928 12.1 10.3 22.4 11.7
7. 1929—1938 13.8 2.1 15.9 2.5
8. 1939—1948 15.7 6.1 21.8 7.3
9. 1946—1955 17.6 6.0 23.6 7.2
Total, excluding military
5a. 1909—1918 11.5 9.4 20.9 10.7
6a. 1919—1928 11.3 10.8 22.0 12.1
7a. 1929—1938 13.4 2.1 15.5 2.5
8a. 1939—1948 13.2 3.9 17.1 4.5




10. 1869—1888 8.4 12.0 20.4 13.2
11. 1889—1908 10.6 12.4 23.0 13.8
12. 1909—1928 11.8 10.4 22.2 11.8
13. 1929—1955 15.6 4.7 20.2 5.6
Total, excluding military
10. 1869—1888 8.4 12.0 20.4 13.2
11. 1889—1908 10.6 12.4 23.0 13.8
12a. 1909—1928 11.4 10.1 21.4 11.4
13a. 1929—1955 13.7 4.2 17.9 4.9
(continued)




PerCent of Gross NattonaI Product Net National
rroauct
Net Net Gross









14.1869—1878 7.8 11.9 19.8 12.9
15.1879—1888 8.4 11.4 19.8 12.4
16.1889—1898 10.2 11.8 22.0 13.2
17.1899—1908 9.8 11.6 21.4 12.9
18.1909—1918 10.7 9.9 20.5 11.0
19.1919—1928 11.2 9.5 20.6 10.7
20.1929—1938 12.6 1.9 14.5 2.2
21.1939—1948 12.6 4.9 17.5 5.6
22.1946—1955 15.1 5.1 20.2 6.0
Longer Periods (averages
of percentages)
23.1869—1888 8.1 11.6 19.8 12.6
24.1889—1908 10.0 11.7 21.7 13.0
25.1909—1928 11.0 9.7 20.6 10.8
26.1929—1955 13.3 3.9 17.2 4.5
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
SOURCE: Gross and net national product: Decade averages given in or calculated from
Tables R-1, R-6, and R-1 1. The Commerce series was estimated by converting the
gross national product series in constant prices (see Table 8) to current prices by an
index calculated by extrapolating the implicit price index for 1929—1938 by the
implicit price index in our Variant III series for the earlier years. From the result-
ing estimates of gross national product in current prices we subtracted our estimate
of capital consumption (see below).
Capital consumption and capitai formation: Decade averages given in or calculated
from Tables R-4, R-8, R-14, and R-16. For procedure used in calculating the per-
centages for decades, and the arerages of percentages for longer periods, see notes to
Table 8.
Variant I for 1946—1955, for the share of net capital formation in net
national product, both excluding net military investment.
We may now ask how the view of capital formation as the saved
portion of national proluct helps us understand the factors that
determine the volumes of and trends in capital formation. It would be
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inipossible here, and for that matter anywhere—with our limited
knowledge—to develop a cogent theory that would connect the saving
process with capital formation, and would explain why the levels and
trends of capital formation are of the order suggested by our estimates.
But it is possible and useful to sketch the lines of connection and in-
fluence and thus point the way for further analysis.
In this outline we begin with net capital formation, try to connect
it with the net saving process, and then deal with capital consumption,
the other component of gross capital formation, treating it as a func-
tion of the long-term cumulation of past net capital additions.
1. Our initial observation is that net capital formation may be
financed out of personal savings (including those of unincorporated
enterprises, whether farm or nonfarm), out of undistributed profits or
net income of corporations, and out of government funds (the excess
of current revenues over current expenditures). Goldsmith's monu-
mental study of saving helps us to see roughly the relative importance
of these three sources of financing in total net savings or total net capi-
tal formation since 1897. During the two periods unaffected by war
and major depressions, 1899—1908 and 1919—1928, personal savings ac-
counted for over 70 per cent of all net savings or net capital formation;
corporate savings, for about 21 per cent; and government savings, for
almost 7 per cent.6 During the war-affected decades, 1909—1918 and
1939—1948, governments incurred substantial dissavings, and total per-
sonal savings were either close to or far exceeded total net capital
formation. With total net savings or net capital formation averaging
in nonwar and nondepression decades between 12 and 13 per cent of
net national product, personal savings contributed between 8.5 and
slightly over 9 per cent of net national product, corporations almost
3 per cent of national product, and governments somewhat less than
1 per cent of national product.In terms of disposable personal in-
come, personal savings in the "normal" periods were about 10 per cent.
These rough orders of magnitude—which would have to be modified
if we carried the estimates back to the nineteenth century when net
savings or net capital formation proportions were somewhat higher—
indicate that we must pay most attention to the factors that determine
personal savings. In a country with an economic and social structure
6Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. I
(Princeton University Press, 1955), Table T-l, p. 345. In Table S-12, p. 271, Gold-
smith shows the shares of major saver groups in the 'normal" period to be about 72
per cent for personal, 20.4 per cent for corporate, and 7.4 per cent for government.
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such as ours, the proportion of net savings that can be contributed
either by corporations or by governments will necessarily be limited.
The executive branches of the government are not permitted to use
large proportions of current revenues—let alone large proportions of
total national product—for capital investment. There is little justifica-
tion for levying taxes upon individuals and the private business sector
to permit the government to, finance capital undertakings without in-
terest charges, except in a major war when the government is forced to
make huge military capital investments. Under such conditions current
expenditures are likely to exceed current revenues, so that not only
military capital formation biit even part of current expenditures may
be financed Out of savings of individuals and corporations. In other
words, the secular leve' of g6vernment capital formation financed Out
of current revenues rather than borrowing, in nonauthoritarian so-
cieties like the United States, is bound to be a minor fraction of na-
tional product and, indeed, of total net savings or capital formation.
The limits on the net savings contributed by corporations are not
as narrow as those on governments' contributions, but they are con-
fining nevertheless. To begin with, net income originating in corpo-
rations is only a fraction of;the country's national income: since 1929
the share has been somewhat more than one-half, and it was probably
lower in the earlier decades.8 The share of national income originating
in corporations that could be classified as total net profits, after all ex-
penses but before payment of taxes and dividends, is limited by com-
petition of other corporations and by noncorporate enterprises engaged
in business. It is limited also by taxes, which increase as net profits in-
crease whether the profits are paid out as dividends or retained as
undistributed earnings. And, finally, even disregarding the large corpo-
rate sector in public utilities that is subject to special limiting regula-
tions, most corporate busiress is carried on by units whose shares are
traded on public investment markets. Any tendency to keep the level
of undistributed profits unduly high exposes such corporations—if their
7 This statement is, of course, too simplified and rigid. Changing technology
may increase the share of government savings, by permitting the use of taxes for
capital investment, such as construction of highways. Changing demand may induce
governments to use taxes for construction of hospitals, and changing political vie's
may well enlarge the share of governments in savings and capital formation even
in times of peace. The statement in the text is a capsule summary of limitations
on the share of governments in the saving process as they characterized most of
the period before World War II.
S See U.S. Income and Output (Supplement, Survey of Current Business, 1958),
Table 1-12, pp. l34—I5.
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shares are widely held—to possible "capture" by outsiders, since the
price of their shares may be more affected by the level of their divi-
dend payments than by that of their net profits. All these circum-
stances combined would tend to keep corporate savings at limited pro-
portions of net profits, at even lower proportions of net income origi.
nating in the corporate sector, and, finally, at quite low proportions of
national income or net national product. These comments should, of
course, be supplemented by analysis showing the quantitative limits
in actual operation—a task beyond the scope of this study. However,
although the comments do not indicate why the share of corporate
savings in recent decades is less than 3 per cent of net national product
or only about one-fifth of all net savings, they do suggest the variety of
factors that limit rather narrowly the share of corporate savings.
2. Turning to the main source of net savings, individuals, we begin
by suggesting that the indicated savings proportions—about 10 per
cent of their disposable income in "normal" times, and perhaps 11 or
12 per cent in the decades from 1870 to 1900—seem quite low. It should
be remembered that according to our estimates, per capita income,
and presumably also per capita disposable income, was rising over the
period at a rate of about 17 per cent per decade. Such a rate means
that in just two decades per capita income in real terms would rise
from an assumed initial level of 100 to 136.9. Assume for the sake of
illustration that, with a constant population, consumption was 100 in
the first decade (i.e., no savings) and that by the third decade con-
sumption rose only 10 per cent. Then in that third decade individuals'
savings would be 26.9 out of 136.9 or close to 20 per cent. The illustra-
tion is unrealistic in several ways, but it serves to stress the major
point: the persistence of a limited ratio of personal savings to income,
under conditions of a relatively high rate of growth in real per capita
income, means that all but a small fraction of the gain in income is
absorbed in increased consumption. It follows that one major factor
in explaining the rate of personal savings, under such conditions of
growth as occurred in the United States, is the great responsiveness
of consumption, as evidenced by its capacity to absorb all but 10 per
cent (slightly more in the earlier decades) of the gain in per capita
income.
This is hardly the place to deal with the aspects of the economic and
social structure of the United States that explain this pressure for
ever-rising levels of consumption per capita. Many come easily to mind:
the relative freedom of individuals and consumers; the widespread
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social mobility that has charaterized our society; the increasing con-
centration of population in cities, where the practice of imitation (the
so-called "demonstration effec") is so natural, making higher con-
sumption levels necessary if oniy to offset the increasing discomforts
of urban life. Indeed, the fact that economic growth has been at-
tained so largely by technological discovery and improvement—creat-
ing new products for ultimate: consumers—and that this technological
change has been further impelled by imbalances created in the past
(with more cars creating the need for more roads, and the like), sug-
gests that rising consumption levels are a built-in feature of the whole
process of economic growth in this country.9
With the pressure for higii-leve1 consumption in mind, any con-
sideration of why the perso4al savings-income proportion was at a
given level, would involve analysis of the factors that impel such sav-
ings, despite the pressure for use of current income for current con-
sumption. Such analysis would proceed most effectively from the over-
simplified but nevertheless useful dichotomy between the vast majority
of people whose income position is below the very top and whose
savings, therefore, have to be tailored to the indispensable needs which
such savings must satisfy, and: the very top group of income recipients
who can afford a much higher savings-income rate without limiting
their consumption standards. Our current data on savings-income pat.
terns are unfortunately affected too much by the use of annual in-
come as the basis for classification by size, and the transient elements
in such income make for an exaggerated contrast between savings in
the top brackets and dissavings in the lower brackets. We might divide
the whole body of personal savers into two groups: the overwhelming
majority—say, the lower 95 per cent classified by their relatively per-
manent income position—who perhaps account for 80 per cent of in-
come and 50 per cent of total personal net savings; and the top 5 per
cent who account for the ot1er 50 per cent of total personal savings.
A countrywide savings-inconie rate of 10 per cent under these condi-
tions implies a savings-income ratio of about 6 per cent (or 5:80) for
the lower 95 per cent, and of 25 per cent (5:20) for the top 5 per cent.
The figures are illustrative, intended only to suggest the broad lines of
the dichotomy.'°
9SeeRuth P. Mack,Trends in American Consumption and the Aspiration to
Consume," American Economic Review, May 1956, PP. 55—68.
10Muchof the discussion that Miows was presented in Kuzrtets, 'Economic Growth
and Income Inequality," American Economic Review, March 1955, pp. 1—28, par.
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3. For the lower group of income recipients, hereafter referred to
as the L group, savings are geared to minimum needs, which may arise
from many considerations: cash balances against sudden emergencies;
saving for future bulk purchases or expenses; and saving for retirement.
We know too little about practices with respect to these savings needs,
but the dominant one—saving for retirement—lends itself to a simple
illustration that indicates the major demographic and economic forces
involved.
Assume for simplicity that the working, income-earning life of an in-
dividual is 40 years, from, say, age 20 to age 60; the expected retirement
period is 10 years, from 60 to 70; and no allowance is made for any
legacy or the like. Assume also that the income needs during retire-
ment are one-half the total annual income during active life. Then
if we disregard interest accumulation, savings needed for retirement
would equal one-eighth of the average annual income during the 40
years of active life (1%multipliedby 1/2),asavings-income ratio of
12.5 per cent. An allowance for interest, which would depend upon the
rate that is assumed, the time pattern of earnings, and the time pattern
of retirement expenditures, would presumably bring the savings-income
ratio well below 12.5 per cent.
However, if population, other demographic variables, and per
worker income are constant, and the retirement savings scheme out-
ticularly pp. 7—12. See also Appendixes C and D of idem, "International Differences
in Capital Formation and Financing," Capital Formation and Economic Growth
(Special Conference Series, No. 6, Princeton for NBER, 1955), pp. 82—106.
This chapter was written before I read Milton Friedman's A Theory of the Con-
sumption Function (Princeton for NBER, 1957). His analysis would lead me to
qualify the magnitude of difference in the savings-income ratios suggested, although
it is already much narrower than that suggested by statistical data for pre-Worid
War II years. But these would be largely qualifications, for two reasons. First, I
am dealing here with permanent income more in the sense of lifetime income than
with the distinctive concept that Friedman employs—the empirical counterpart of
which appears to be a level characterizing a period of about three years. For life-
time income, I see no escape from the conclusion that units whose average income
is near the subsistence level would have a savings-income ratio of close to zero;
and that units whose lifetime income is high in the scale, and who would pre-
sumably wish to preserve that position for themselves and their descendants, would
have fairly high savings-income ratios. Second, even Friedman finds that his perma-
nent savings-income ratios for entrepreneurs are double those for employees; and
while he ascribes the difference to a greater income dispersion for the former, the
association with the difference in permanent income levels is not denied. It is quite
possible that further differentiation among socio-economic groups distinguished by
different lifetime income levels (or even Friedmans permanent income levels) would
yield a further variation in the savings-income ratio.
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lined above is actually folIowd, total dissavings of retired persons
would exactly equal the current savings of people still in the active
labor force, and aggregate savifigs would be zero, not 12.5 per cent or
less of total income of the population. But population and per capita
income do grow. In the United States the income mass or total income
in real terms grew at the rate of about 37.5 per cent per decade. In
the illustration above, the average time span between active and retired
life is something like 25 years.: Hence the income level and savings of
active workers exceed the expenditure-dissavings level of the retired
group by the ratio of (1.375 raised to the power of 2'/2)to1, or 2.217.
The aggregate savings then are 12.5 per cent multiplied by 1.217, or
roughly 15 per cent of an income mass which in relation to the actual
is as 1is to 2.217. The implicit aggregate net savings-income fraction
is then 15 per cent divided by 2.217, or slightly less than 7 per cent.
The illustration is, of course, hypothetical: the empirical coefficients
are roughly realistic, but the assumption of retirement needs is purely
notional. Its importance, however, is that it suggests the major factors
that determine the aggregate savings-net income ratio for the over-
whelming proportion of the income earning population: not only
their savings plans but also the relative magnitudes of the active and
the retired population, and the differences between their expenditure
levels. It would be relatively easy to shape the empirical coefficient to
yield an aggregate savings-income proportion of some 5 to 6 per cent.
While this would be partly amatterof arbitrary design, one shoUld
note that many of the coefficients used—the relative duration of active
and of retirement life, the rate of growth in numbers of population
and of active workers, and in per capita real income—are fairly realistic.
One can legitimately argue that in this direction lies the promise of
explaining why the personal savings-income proportions in the United
States were 10 to 12 per cent, and not 2 to 3, or 20 to 30. Such an ex-
planation would also bring us close to understanding why the net
capital formation proportions in net national product before the 1930's
ranged from 11 to 14 per cent, and not from 2 to 4, or from 20 to 3Ø•11
ii Theanalysis in the text, which deals with savings and dissavings associated
with retirement, can be applied to savings connected with or in anticipation of
any future expenditures (dissavings). Thus, in the early years of marriage before
the arrival of children, funds my be saved as a reserve against expenditures on
children; and then, with their arrival, a period of dissaving may ensue. The pat-
tern of analysis of such expenditure-oriented savings, and the problem of weight.
ing the individual life-cycle patterns into aggregates in a growing population with
growing per capita income wouki be the same as those suggested in the text.
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4. This outline of the factors involved in determining the personal
savings-income rate for the L group at a given point of time, is useful
also in suggesting the possible long-term trends. In general, the rapid
rise in real income per capita suggests the possibility of an upward
movement in the savings-income ratio. That movement may be offset
to some extent by such counteracting factors as the desire and need
for higher consumption occasioned partly by changing conditions of
life (urbanization, need for greater education and training, and the
like) and partly by the stimulus of new products. The more interesting
implication of the scheme outlined above, however, lies in the demo-
graphic and income-growth factors. All other conditions being equal,
retardation in the rate of growth of population and of per capita in-
come would produce a lower aggregate net savings-income ratio. Thus,
if in the illustrative example we had assumed that the population and
per capita income grew at the rate of 5 per cent per decade, yielding a
decadal rate of growth of total income of 10.25 per cent (rather than
the 7.5 per cent shown in our Variant I estimates and used in the
illustration), the aggregate net personal savings rate derived for the
L group would have been only 2.7 per cent instead of about 7. (With
a decadal rate of growth of 10.25 per cent, the cumulation over twenty-
five years yields an income mass of 1.276, and the savings rate equals
12.5 per cent multiplied by 0.276, divided by 1.276.)
It follows that, with the retardation in the rate of growth of national
income observed in the United States, the factors suggested above as
determining savings would make for a secularly lower personal savings-
income ratio—provided the other assumptions of the hypothetical
scheme remained constant. But they need not remain constant: the
duration of retirement life relative to that of active life may become
longer than that assumed in the calculation; the proportion of active-
life income desired for retirement life may rise. Moreover, other needs
for savings—emergencies or bulk purchases—though minor, may be
subject to trends of their own. Clearly, we are dealing here with a
complex situation in which forces of vast variety are operating, some
making for a higher savings-income ratio for the L group, others tend-
ing to produce a lower ratio as time goes on. All we can do here is
indicate the factors that seem important, and that would therefore
suggest directions in which further research could fruitfully be under-
taken. It seems particularly useful, also, to indicate in such an outline
the relations by which one aspect of economic growth, such as the
retardation in the rate of growth of total income, is connected—in
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ways that may not have been stressed heretofore—with another, such
as the possible constancy of the savings-income ratio in the face of
a rising per capita income, or even some tendency for the savings-
income ratio to drop.
5. Minimum needs can play only a limited role in determining the
savings patterns of the upper group of income recipients (the U
group), and consequently, the problem of explaining the level of the
savings-income ratio for this group is more difficult. Why, for in-
stance, did we assume, in our illustration of the dichotomy, that the
savings-income ratio for the U group was 25 per cent? It could, pre-
sumably, have been 50 per cent, since consumption per capita of the
U group would still have been over twice that of the L group. Yet if
the savings-income ratio of the U group had been 50 rather than 25
per cent, the countrywide personal savings-income ratio would have
been 15 rather than 10 per cent.
What, then, limits the savings-income ratio for the U group? It is
difficult even to suggest an answer, in our general ignorance of the
economics of the small upper groups in society. The only complex of
relevant factors that comes to mind is suggested by the continuous
gradation of per capita consumption levels and savings proportions
that one finds in cross-section studies of family income and expendi-
tures. In these arrays of families grouped in increasing order of in-
come position, there is always a continuous and gradual rise in con-
sumption per head, in savings per head, and in the proportion of
savings to income. Particularly in a society like that of the United
States, there is no dichotomy of the oversimplified type suggested in
our illustration. There is no clear line of division and contrast between
the "poor" masses and the "rich" elite, but a great range of "middle"
classes forming a continuous bridge from the lowest to the highest
levels of the income distribution. The implication of this gradation
is that patterns of social and economic life produce—i.e., make possible,
and to some extent compel—ever-rising consumption and expenditure
standards with rises in relative position in the long-term income scale.
This implication has direct bearing upon our question in the sense
of setting some upper limits to the savings-income fraction. To illus-
trate: at the upper reaches of the L group, before we pass into the
U group, the savings-income fraction may be as high as, say, 12 per
cent (compared with the average for the L group of about 6 per cent).
The next group in the array, in the lower reaches of the U group, may
have a per capita income, say, 10 per cent higher; but it would tend to
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have a consumption level per capita that would also be somewhat
higher. Even if its consumption level were not higher but merely equal
to that of the upper segment of the L group, its savings-income ratio
could not exceed (12 + 10): 110, or 20 per cent. If, then, consumption
levels rise with a rise in the income level, that is, if differentials in con-
sumption persist in response to differentials in income, either because
human beings naturally adjust themselves to higher standards of living
or because they regard consumption as a symbol of higher social posi-
tion and thus a means of setting themselves above their neighbors,
there are dehnite limits to the savings-income ratio of the U group.
These limits are in fact determined by the desire and need to maintain
consumption levels above those of the lower neighboring economic
groups.12
The precise working out of this hypothesis in quantitative terms,
demonstrating why the savings-income ratio for the U group happens
to be x rather than y, or s times the ratio for the L group rather than t,
would involve analysis of the whole income and consumption structure
of the population of this country. Here again all we can do is point out
the connecting links—this time between the factors that motivate high-
level consumption and the limits set upon the savings-income ratio.
But even this is of value, if it directs our attention into the proper
channels.
6. What bearing have the savings-income proportions upon long-
term trends? For the U group it lies partly in the trend in their savings-
income ratio, partly in the trend in their share in total income. An
increase in either means a secular rise in the ratio of aggregate sav-
ings to total income; a decline means a secular decline in the ratio.
Little new can be said here relative to long-term trends in the
savings-income ratio for the U group proper: given the linking of
their consumption patterns with the consumption levels of the rest
of the population, their savings-income ratio would be subject to the
same growth factors as the ratio for the rest of the population would
be. And what we have said above about the pressures for high and
rising levels of consumption expenditures would apply pan passu to
the U group, so far as the effects of technical progress in the way of new
products and the continuous desire for groups to differentiate them-
selves from those immediately below would produce a rise in the
12 In this connection see the emphasis on the demonstration effect and the inter-
dependence of the tastes of consumer units in James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving.
and the Theory of Consumer Behavior (Harvard University Press, 1949).
105Trends in Total Capital Formation
consumption levels of the U group and thus prevent its savings-income
ratio from rising.
In dealing with the trends in the income shares, we encounter a new
problem. The inequality in the distribution of savings may well be
greater, and in fact was greater, in recent decades in the United States,
than that in the distribution of property incomes, and hence of assets.
This is because of the frequency of a combination of large service
incomes with large property incomes. All other conditions being equal,
persistence of a higher share of savings than of property in the hands
of the U group should result in an even greater concentration of
property, hence of property incomes, hence of total incomes. In other
words, in the greater concentration of savings in the U group there is a
built-in tendency to produce increasing concentration of income—and,
to that extent, even further concentration of savings. It is important,
therefore, to consider whether any factors tend in the long run to
counteract the concentration of savings, and the inferred effect—the
secular rise in the income share of the U group.
These counteracting factors can be briefly listed. The most obvious
is, of course, intervention on the part of society, in the form of eco-
nomic legislation relating to both inheritance and income. Just as in-
heritance taxation was introduced to break up the cumulation of large
property holdings—the mechanism by which the tendency suggested
above operates—so, in recent decades, progressive income taxation was
introduced to limit the relative excess of the per unit incomes of the
U group over the per unit incomes of the L group.
But there are more important if less obvious factors. In the demo-
graphic growth of a country like the United States, with natural in-
crease much lower in the U group than in the L group, and immigra.
tion swelling the numbers in the L group, the relative numerical in-
crease in an initially top group is smaller than in that of the rest of
the population. Consequently the U group of the 1870's comprising the
top 5 per cent cannot, with its descendants, account for the top 5 per
cent of the population in the 1920's. It follows that on this account
alone the U group of the 1920's includes a fairly substantial proportion
of units that have come up from the lower ranks and the cumulation
of whose wealth may not lead to as much concentration of income. An
even more important factor lies in the dynamism of the economy of
the United States, in the shift of focus of growth, and hence of sources
of wealth, from one industry to another, from one area to another.
With such shifts, the successful entrepreneurs of a generation ago or
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their descendants are rarely among the ranks of the successful today.
This change in identity of successful entrepreneurs means continuous
turnover in the composition of the top group and prevents persistent
accumulation of wealth in the same hands. Finally, one must also con-
sider the service income component of the income of the U group.
Already high and tending to be concentrated in the high per capita
earnings sectors, it is not likely to rise as rapidly as the per capita service
income of the L group, which is affected both by increases within in-
dustrial sectors and by shifts in the distribution of the gainfully oc-
cupied from sectors with lower per capita earnings to those with higher
per capita earnings.
These comments, which suggest the factors that counteract any pos-
sible concentration of income in the hands of the U group, in and of
themselves tell nothing about the possible trends in its income share.
The continuous entry of new economically successful units may be ac-
companied by a rising share of income for the U group, if the new units
capture more of the growing income than was captured by the suc-
cessful units of preceding generations. Or the share of the U group in
income may decline, if the sources of new wealth are not as large pro-
portionately as they were in earlier times. All one can say is that prima
facie there is no case for expecting the trend in the income share of
the U group to be upward; and that in more recent times factors oper-
ated to reduce that share.
7. With the income share and savings-income ratio constant, the
savings contribution of the U group, as a percentage of net national
product, would also tend to be constant in the long run; or would di-
minish if, under legislative and other pressures, property yields were
to decline and progressive income taxation rates increase. There are
also a variety of factors that could keep the savings-income ratio of the
L group constant, and this constant ratio, combined with retardation
in the rate of growth of total income, could result in a downward turn
of the long-term savings-income proportion. While the comments
above are far short of an explanation of the trends in the aggregate
personal savings-income proportion, they do point to and emphasize
the directions in which the explanatory hypotheses might be found and
the fields in which further data could be mobilized for specifying and
testing them.
In the present connection, an additional factor should be noted.
The preceding discussion suggested that there is no firm ground for
expecting a secular rise in the proportion of personal savings to in-
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come, and that in fact some factors would make for a downward trend
in this proportion. However, it must be remembered that we are
discussing money savings here, whereas countrywide net capital forma-
tion proportions, even in current prices, reflect real processes. It is
quite possible for the money savings-income proportion for all in-
dividuals and even for all corporations to rise, while the countrywide
net capital formation proportion declines, because governments may
absorbsavings for uses that are not additions to capital stock. This is,
in fact, what happened during World War II and in some of the post-
war years when military expenditures were unusually large.
This points to an additional factor that in recent decades con-
tributed to a downward trend in the net capital formation proportion—
a factor that comes from the uses side, rather than from the savings side,
although technically it can be expressed as a decline in the contribu-
tion of government savings. There is no need to stress the possible
weight of this factor in the present and foreseeable future, considering
the major shifts that have occurred in international relations and the
greater burdens that governments have had to assume to preserve the
security of their countries.
8. The comments so far have borne directly upon the net capital
formation levels and trends, viewing the levels as savings proportions
of net national product and linking both levels and trends with the
factors that determined levels of and trends in personal savings-income
ratios. We conclude with a brief outline of the relations between the
net capital and gross capital proportions or—what amounts to the same
thing—the relations between net capital formation and capital con-
sumption.
In the simplest model, which is adequate for our purposes, capital
consumption is a straight-line function of past capital formation, and
it is at any given time equal to some fraction of the gross value of
capital stock, net of retirements. Given the life span of capital equip-
ment, the ratio of depreciable capital (fixed durable) to nondepreciable
(inventories and foreign claims), and the past rate of growth of net
capital formation, it is possible to derive capital consumption and
hence gross capital formation.
To illustrate: assume that, in the past, net fixed (subject to deprecia-
tion) capital formation and the useful life of capital equipment re-
mained constant. Capital consumption would then equal net fixed
capital formation, and in fact retirements would equal total capital
consumption. For under these conditions, the sum of the fractions
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representing current depreciation can be shown to equal one-half the
constant annual gross fixed capital formation, or a full year's net fixed
capital additions. In this case, net fixed capital formation would be 50
per cent of gross fixed capital formation; and the size of the proportion
of gross fixed capital formation to gross national product would be a
direct function of net fixed capital formation. Thus, if the latter is
15 and net national product 100, then the gross fixed capital forma-
tion proportion would be 30 divided by 115, or roughly 26 per cent.
The illustration can be modified to allow for the growth of net fixed
capital formation at a certain percentage rate. With such growth, the
earlier levels of capital accumulation, which affect current depreciation,
are below those of current net additions; fixed capital stock gross of
depreciation and net of retirements, the base that determines deprecia-
tion charges, will not be twice net fixed capital stock but somewhat
less; capital consumption charges, instead of being equal to net fixed
capital formation, will be smaller; and net fixed capital formation will
be more than 50 per cent of gross. In general, the higher the rate of
growth of net fixed capital formation and the longer the period of
life from entry into use to retirement, the lower the ratio of capital
consumption to net fixed capital formation, the higher the ratio of
the latter to gross fixed capital formation, and the smaller the relative
excess of the gross fixed capital formation proportion over the net.
The lower the rate of growth of net fixed capital formation and the
shorter the life of capital goods, the higher the ratio of capital con-
sumption to current net fixed capital formation, the lower the ratio of
the latter to gross fixed capital formation, and the greater the rela-
tive excess of the gross fixed capital formation proportion over the
net.'3
This simple model can serve as an outline for explaining both the
levels of and the long-term trends in the capital consumption and
13 For aualgebraic analysis of these relations see Appendix B of my paper. "In-
ternational Differences in Capital Formation and Financing," in Capital Formation
and Economic Growth, pp. 76—81. The analysis there is in terms of gross national
product and the gross capital formation proportion, but can be restatedin
terms of rates of growth of net national product and assumed constancy of the net
capital formation proportion.
The formulation in the text is limited to depreciable capital. Total capital also
includes inventories and claims against foreign countries, neither of which is sub-
ject to depreciation. Hence the relations indicated in the text apply to gross and
net total capital formation only if the trends in the shares of the nondepreciable
components are of limited magnitude and do not offset the effects of retardation
in the rate of growth of fixed—depreciable—capital formation.
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gross capital formation proportions, given the levels of and trends in
the net capital formation share in net national product. Additional
data are needed on the period of useful life of durable capital goods
subject to depreciation, the method of apportioning depreciation over
time (whether along a straight line or by some curve), and the pro-
portion of total capital subject to depreciation. Such additional data
are, to be sure, reflections of a variety of factors: the rapidity of ob-
solescence induced by technological progress and changes in taste (the
latter being to some extent a function of the former); and the factors
that determine the share in total capital of fixed durable assets, and the
shares of inventories and of claims against foreign countries. Some
light may be shed on these factors in the next chapter when we consider
the distribution of total capital formation by type of capital good.
For the present it is sufficient to indicate the identity of the empirical
coefficients and the factors they represent, in passing from the net
capital formation proportion to the gross.
The bearing upon long-term trends is also clear. In particular, if
as suggested above, the net capital formation proportion in the long
run tends to be constant at best, while there is retardation in the rate
of growth of net national product, it follows that the rate of growth
of net capital formation must decline. And indeed we found such
retardation in discussing the long-term movement of net capital forma-
tion shown in Table 2. Given such retardation, it follows from the
simple model above—which assumes constancy of useful life of durable
capital and of the proportion of total capital subject to depreciation—
that the proportion of capital consumption to net capital formation
is bound to show an upward trend; the proportion of net capital for-
mation to gross capital formation, a declining trend; and the gross
capital formation proportion, less of a declining trend than the net
capital formation proportion and, if the latter proportion is declining,
the gross capital formation proportion may fail to show a decline.
Thus, the various lines of connection outlined above do in fact promise
an explanation of the results in Tables 8 and 9 insofar as they reveal
a long-term decline in the net capital formation proportion coincident
with rough stability in the gross capital formation proportion.
Savings and Capital Formation
The discussion in the two preceding sections elaborates our view that
the explanation of the levels of and trends in capital formation in
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this country is to be sought in the saving process—in the factors that
govern the supply of savings rather than the demand for capital funds.
It is in the economic and social constraints on the savings contribution
of governments and of private corporations, and in the factors that
govern the consumption and savings patterns of individuals—the main
source of savings—that we may find the basis for a theory that would
cogently account for the levels of and trends in at least the proportion
of capital formation to national product. This would leave the ex-
planation incomplete in that we would still have to account for the
levels of national product itself and its trends. But even so, a valid
explanation of the capital formation proportion would link the latter
closely with the basic processes of economic growth. It would also
permit, given some basis for projection or assumption of future trends
in national product, an estimation of the probable course of capital
formation.
The suggested basic importance of the saving process tempts one to
argue that it was the supply of savings that limited capital formation
in the past, and that it was not limited by demand for capital created
by technological change and investment opportunities. But no such
inference can be drawn from our discussion and, for reasons set forth
below, no firm inference can really be drawn as to whether it was the
supply or demand side that limited capital formation in the past.
To begin with, the explanatory hypotheses above, as indicated re-
peatedly, did not, and in the present state of analysis cannot, yield
specific coefficients. We did not and could not demonstrate that the
economic and social conditions under which governments and pri-
vate corporations operate make it impossible for them to contribute
savings of more than 1 and 3 per cent, respectively, of net national
product. We did not and could not demonstrate that the factors gov-
erning saving by individuals make it impossible or at least exceedingly
difficult for them to contribute savings that, in the long run, amount
to more than 10 to 12 per cent of net national product. And since it
was not feasible to demonstrate that the factors on the supply-of-
savings side could not have permitted significantly higher net capital
formation proportions, or even significantly different trends, it is pos-
sible that the levels and trends that were in fact attained were lower
than the savings potential alone could have generated. It is possible
also that reduction to levels below the savings potential was produced
by some constraining factors on the demand side.
An even more important qualification of our results is that the
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whole discussion so far has dealt with the demand for savings and
supply of savings separately; and the reasoning has been in terms of
demand, as suggested by capital-output ratios, and of supply, as sug-
gested by capital formation proportions. But the actual capital forma-
tion proportions and capital-output ratios cannot be fully explained by
factors that deal with ex ante demand by users of savings and ex ante
supply by the savers. Savings are generated by individuals or corpora-
tions in specific forms and offered for use only on certain conditions—
yield, security, duration of loan, and so forth. There may be demand
for these funds, but from sources and on conditions that do not match
those of the offer. It is the basic function of financial intermediaries
to deal with this problem of matching the demand and supply of
savings; and the actually observed capital formation volumes are not
equal either to ex ante demand or to ex ante supply, but to some bal-
ancing of the two. We have yet to consider the mechanism for such
balancing.
Once we introduce the financial intermediaries, defined most broadly
as the institutional mechanism for bringing together supply of and
demand for savings, and set the basic lines of the money and credit sys-
tem as a framework within which such meshing can effectively and
continuously occur, two major groups of questions arise. The first is
suggested by the credit-creating powers of some financial interme-
diaries, and by the money policy power of governments and of those
agencies to which such power may be delegated. In the long run, could
not the creation of credit or attempts at financing through issuance of
new money be the dominant factor in setting the capital formation
proportion in the country? Assume, as suggested above, that factors
that determine voluntary savings ratios by private economic agencies
and even by governments limit the proportion of product that can
be devoted to capital formation. Could not credit creation or money
inflation be used to force diversion of larger proportions to capital
users? The answer to this question would lie in examination of the
limits to such "forced" saving set by the reaction of voluntary saving.
Such limits can be clearly seen if we assume that credit creation or
financing with new money will raise prices (or keep them constant,
whereas they might otherwise decline). Under such conditions, the
units whose economic power has been reduced by the rise in prices (or
by their failure to decline) may react by continuing to consume as
much as before, and hence reduce their actual voluntary savings below
the level that could otherwise have been expected. If this happens, the
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total volume of savings actually realized may not be any larger than
it would have been without credit creation or new money issue. In-
deed, under certain circumstances the effort to accelerate saving by
excessive credit creation or new money issues may have the opposite
effect, if, for example, it undermines the faith of the would-be savers
in the stability of purchasing power of the money claims that embody
their savings. Under different conditions, a controlled development of
the credit creating power of financial intermediaries, or the intelligent
pursuit of an active money policy by the government, may result in a
net increase in countrywide savings and the capital formation propor.
tions—over and above what they might otherwise have been.
The questions just touched upon relate to the long-run effects of
countrywide savings and the capital formation proportions. The second
group of questions is connected with the short-run effects. We have
discussed the processes in their long-term aspects because our interest
is in long-term trends. But in reality everything takes place in the
short run—from day to day—even though long-term considerations
play an important part. Yet when we deal with the short-term aspects
of economic life we may, and usually do, find that in the rather com-
plex flow of savings into investment, the meshing of available savings
with the demand for them is not simple and automatic. Granted that
in the long run a country's economic institutions, particularly its
financial intermediaries, are generally capable of resolving discrepancies
in the conditions of supply of savings and of demand for capital funds.
But such adjustments take time. At any one moment the offered supply
of savings can exceed the real demand for them. In this sense, limita-
tions on capital formation cannot lie entirely on the supply-of-savings
side.
Note that this problem of short-term adjustment is, paradoxically,
in itself a long-term problem. In any economy, particularly a rapidly
growing one, there are ever-present shifts among groups in the dis-
tribution of income and within groups in the structure of their con-
sumption and savings. The supply of savings is,therefore, flowing
from ever-changing sources for ever-changing needs under ever-chang-
ing conditions; and the demand of would-be users for savings is sub-
ject to an equally varied and continuously changing set of circum-
stances. Itis unlikely that the adjustments, assumed to take place
eventually and thus resolve the failure of conditions of supply of
and demand for savings to mesh, can ever catch up with these changes
that continually create new maladjustments. One can, therefore, en-
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visage actual capital formation as a process that continuously, in the
long run, unfolds at levels below those that could be attained with the
available supply of savings, because of the ever-present disparities in
conditions of supply and demand. This view, in turn, has other impli-
cations, for capital formation is itself a tool of economic growth, and
any shortfall in it may reduce the rate of growth of national product
and thus affect the savings potential at the next stage. (We point Out,
in passing, that it is evident from the above that the capacity of the
economic and social institutions to adapt themselves to the continuous
adjustment problems of a growing society—the capacity for social in-
vention—is a key to economic growth.)
While granting that the pressures are on both the supply and the
demand side, and that the ways in which the mechanisms connecting
them have affected the actual processes in economic life, we must also
recognize that there is unfortunately no way of measuring the effects
of these mechanisms. Available data give us no inkling of the extent
to which the savings proportion in this country has been affected by
the credit-creating power of the banks or by the money policy followed
by the government. The preceding discussion, which stresses the high
consumption propensity in the American economy, thereby suggests
narrow limits upon the capacity of our credit and money system to
effectuate a net rise in the savings proportion. This is a crude impres-
sion, however, and we are in no position to push this line of analysis
further. Nor can we deny that one characteristic of the short-term but
continuously present problems of balancing supply of savings and de-
mand for savings is the extreme difficulty of measuring their quantita-
tive effect on capital formation. We do not know how to establish, with
reasonable firmness, the magnitude of the savings potential or, alterna-
tively, the reduction effects of the imbalance of conditions of supply
and demand. Measures such as we have are inadequate even for gauging
the overt processes actually taking place. It would be oversanguine to
expect that, without a long period of experimentation and testing, we
could secure any measures of potentials, or of the effects of disparities
between the supply that is being—or would be—offered under varying
conditions, and the demand under matching conditions.
With these considerations in mind, all we can say is that our earlier
discussion leaves us with the impression that it is the long-run factors
on the supply-of-savings side that limit the potential levels and affect
the potential trends of the capital formation proportions, even given
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the mechanisms of credit creation and money-issue financing; and that
the limiting influence of the long-run factors on the demand or capital-
use side seems less important. The impression is strengthened by the
realization of the rapid increase, at least since the second half of the
nineteenth century, in technological knowledge—the host of scientific
discoveries, practical inventions, and production improvements—all
of which have meant, in the long run, a high potential demand for
capital. But this is, nonetheless, no more than an impression, and bears
upon the potentials alone. The actual levels of the capital formation
proportions are affected by continuous problems of short-term and
long-term adjustment, in which, to repeat a famous analogy, demand
and supply are like the two blades of a pair of scissors, and it is only
in their combination that the explanation lies.
The impression of the dominance of long-term forces on the supply-
of-savings side in setting limits to potential capital formation pro-
portions is not, and cannot be, dispelled by consideration of interest
rates. It is true that in the long run even riskiess interest rates have
declined; and one could presumably argue that such a decline pre-
cludes the claim that the factors on the supply side limit the level of
capital formation. Yet the relevance of trends in interest rates to the
question under discussion is only apparent. It is not just that these
rates apply only to the part of the savings flow that takes the form of
external funds seeking placement. Far more important, like all prices,
they measure only the relative pressures of demand upon supply. The
long-term decline in interest rates, whether in current or constant
prices, means simply that the shortage of supply of savings relative to
investment opportunities has become less acute. Or to put it differently:
with the economic growth of the country and the increased supply
of goods per capita, would-be savers give a relatively lower preference
to present supply than to future supply. They are therefore willing to
discount the future at a lower rate, whereas a comparable rise in in-
vestment opportunities over a period of the same duration has not
occurred. Thus, if the discount to be applied to a future twenty years
hence is reduced on the supply-of-savings side (because of greater avail-
ability of goods for distribution between the present and the future),
and if investment opportunities over the same time horizon do not rise
in the same proportion, twenty-year term interest rates will decline. But
the limiting pressure of the supply of savings is still there. The greater
promise of a cogent explanation of intertemporal and international
differences in the levels of and trends in capital formation proportions
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still lies, for reasons suggested in our earlier discussion, in the factors
that determine the savings patterns of the country's population.
These comments should explain our earlier allusion to the impos-
sibility, in the present state of knowledge, of providing a testable
answer to the question whether in the past it was the supply of savings
or the demand for capital funds that limited the levels of the actual
capital formation proportions and determined their trends. \Ve can
have no more than impressions of the potentials on both sides, and
we cannot measure the differences between the actual proportions and
the potential. We shall return to this and related questions at the end
of our analysis, for they are of obvious bearing upon the whole topic
of the use of past experience in a prognosis of the future. It was nec-
essarily touched upon here because the implications of this preliminary
discussion are important in the more detailed analysis that follows.
It should be clear both from this preliminary answer and from much
of the explanatory discussion preceding it that the forces determining
the levels of capital formation and its trends are part of a complex
that involves the full spectrum of demographic, economic, and social
factors, which must be viewed in its entirety in considering the growth
of the economy. It cannot be otherwise, since capital formation is an
integral part of national product, affected by it and affecting it. Yet,
if only because of the variety of the forces involved and the complexity
of their interrelations, no simple scheme that would yield determinate
and unequivocal answers ispossible. The explanatory hypotheses
outlined—although they are carried further perhaps than has been
customary in economic literature—could just as easily have yielded
answers different from those indicated by the statistical measures of
past processes in this country. By using somewhat different assumptions
and coefficients, we could have derived higher or lower levels of capi-
tal formation proportions, rising rather than constant trends in gross
capital formation proportions, and constant rather than declining
trends in net capital formation proportions. All we know at present
is the directions in which further study should proceed—and it may
be that more signposts are needed to lead us to the precise answers
we are seeking.
Under these conditions, the channeling of analytical effort toward
a close examination of the historical record is of the utmost importance.
Such examination should help us avoid preliminary—and, by the na-
ture of the case, dogmatic—hunches. It should compel us to scrutinize
the more detailed parts and their interrelations as they can be ob-
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served in reality, so that the hypothetical links—which must remain
hypothetical at least temporarily—are forged into a chain in which
some other links are strengthened by the reasonably reliable records
of what in fact has happened. What we shall be searching for in the
chapters that follow is more of these sound links, to make sure that any
explanation of the forces that determined capital formation in the
past will be governed by more knowledge of the changing relative
weights of types of capital, of categories of users, of sources and forms
of financing.
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